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Executive Summary
Challenges for policy makers are huge if the EU climate 
policy goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 80-
95% below 1990 levels by 2050 shall be reached. There 
is no doubt that a new energy technology policy design 
for the post-2020 period is needed, not only because the 
current policy framework is running out in 2020, but 
also because of increasing global competitive pressure 
in the low-carbon technology sectors. Moreover, as 
market actors are calling for new, transparent and 
lasting policy commitments now, the policy will likely 
be negotiated in times of financial crisis and institutional 
frictions in the EU, of which no one can predict its 
duration. To contribute to this debate and assist DG 
ENER in preparing a new Communication on ‘Energy 
Technologies in a future European Energy Policy’, this 
THINK report develops and discusses possible paths 
for a renewed EU energy technology policy towards 
2050.
Section 2 demonstrates that there is a need for public 
support to correct for market failures originating from 
the environmental- and innovation externalities, to 
account for capital market imperfections and to fully 
exploit international trade opportunities in clean 
technologies. There further is a need for EU involvement 
to coordinate market failure corrections between 
Member States and to bundle national forces. Last, 
there is a need to re-think current policies to correct for 
limitations of existing policy measures, to give a clear 
and stable vision for post-2020, and, at the same time, 
to reinforce European competitiveness in low-carbon 
technology sectors on the global market and take into 
account the changed context. 
Section 3 illustrates the possible pathways for a new EU 
energy technology policy and discusses the role of the 
SET Plan in these possible futures. The first path implies 
that 2020 policies would be improved and extended 
to 2030 and 2050. From this reference case, we can 
depart in two major ways. Path 2 builds on a strong 
carbon price signal and will mainly involve technology-
neutral support to innovation. In this path, after having 
delivered its initial push, the SET Plan as an instrument 
to prioritize among technologies and projects ceases 
by 2020. It will rather function in a ‘light’ version as a 
platform for open access information exchange and 
stakeholder coordination and cooperation. In contrast, 
an alternative policy path 3 departs from a weak carbon 
price signal and technology targets. Directed technology 
push will play a major role to enforce these targets. In 
this path, an advanced SET Plan would also provide the 
basis for the determination of an optimal portfolio of 
low-carbon technologies across sectors, as well as for 
the optimal allocation of public (especially European) 
funds.
No policy path is clearly superior to another. Our 
evaluation of these policies shows that whereas price 
signals are, in theory, the most cost-efficient way to 
achieve climate goals, in practice the signaling effect of 
carbon prices might not be strong enough. Policymakers 
face considerable difficulties to implement ‘high-
enough’ prices and to include all GHG emissions into 
the scheme. Technology targets and directed push, 
on the other hand, have a relatively larger potential 
to enhance green growth and to give (even if biased 
in magnitude) strong signals to investors. Moreover, 
technology targets could account for different national 
technology push programs and adjust the burden of 
decarbonization among Member States. In times of 
economic crisis and institutional frictions, these burden 
sharing and cooperation mechanisms can increase the 
robustness and implementability of technology support.
Section 4 discusses implications for a revised EU 
energy technology policy. Best practice for technology 
push will depend on the overall energy policy context. 
This context is uncertain, with uncertainty originating 
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from two sources: First, the role of the SET Plan will 
depend on the context of carbon pricing. Second, 
in a bigger perspective, two major concerns adding 
further uncertainties appear. Shifts in paradigm of 
EU energy policy away from decarbonization and 
in favor of competitiveness might weaken carbon 
pricing mechanisms, calling for an even stronger 
technology support. Similarly, a shift in favor of supply 
security requires a stronger push for decarbonization 
technologies to achieve balanced energy portfolios, as 
well as a strong push for enabling technologies such 
as networks to guarantee properly working energy 
systems. Technological revolutions, such as a possible 
global shale gas revolution, could result in the “rational” 
price of carbon falling extremely low. 
This reasoning calls for a renewed post-2020 SET Plan 
that frames the context for future technology push 
and gives credible signals for investors regarding the 
magnitude and direction of push policies. A renewed 
SET Plan should allow for all possible future policy 
paths. It should be more focused and provide the basis 
for planning and prioritization among decarbonization 
technologies. In the first step and similar to the current 
model, stakeholders from individual sectors could 
work together within Industrial Initiatives to identify 
technological progress and future research needs. In 
a second step, priority technologies that (a) are key to 
achieve 2050 objectives, and/or (b) can help to support 
green growth within the Union should be identified 
based on a comprehensive approach across sectors. Such 
targets have to be determined by carefully analyzing 
growth potentials of European manufacturers and the 
degree of competition they face from foreign clean 
technology producers. Selected technology targets and 
EU funding of innovation should then be in line with 
the SET Plan prioritization. 
A prioritization of low-carbon energy technologies 
entails high risks of picking wrong winners, especially 
because future energy market developments such 
as the evolution of shale gas may entirely change 
the benefits and market value of different supply 
technologies. In this vein, for mature technologies 
close to the market, pushing consumption-oriented 
technologies dominates pushing production-oriented 
technologies in terms of both feasibility and robustness. 
First, it is politically feasible: Opposing to a push for 
production technologies that often would benefit 
certain Member States in which major suppliers are 
located, energy efficiency enhancing measures benefit 
all industries independent of geographic location and 
create jobs throughout all Member States. Second, such 
push is robust with respect to future energy market 
developments: Consuming less is a no-regret policy 
and minimizes system interdependences of a directed 
push. 
The creation of options for technology breakthroughs 
has to be a main pillar in any future SET Plan. While 
strategies for technologies close to the market rely 
on shorter-run benefits like green growth stimuli 
up to 2020 or 2030, such push strategies have to be 
accompanied by long-run funding commitments for 
a wide range of immature technologies that might be 
successfully deployable after 2030 and towards 2050. 
Because this stage of innovation involves basic research 
and very early R&D, i.e. projects that entail a low chance 
of success but a sufficiently high pay-off if successful, 
the argument for a broad technology funding becomes 
important. Over time and as the probability of success 
increases, funds should become more concentrated.
Moreover, we present other no-regret measures that 
hold for any future technology policy. Policies should 
enable an attractive and stable business environment, 
there is a need to remove barriers to behavioral change, 
and the limited public money needs to be spent wisely. 
Section 5 concludes.
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1. Introduction
The present EU energy technology policy needs 
to be revisited. Market actors and the European 
public demand new, transparent and lasting 
policy commitments, not only because the current 
technology policy framework is running out in 2020, 
but also because of increasing global competitive 
pressure in the low-carbon technology sectors. In 
light of the prevalent financial and EU debt crisis, 
some Member States recently also abandoned several 
expensive energy regulations, mostly those pushing 
clean energy technologies. A clear policy path that 
takes account of these new developments for the 
post-2020 period is still in its infancies. Our analysis 
builds on recent policy initiatives, including the EU 
Energy Roadmap, the EU renewable energy strategy 
and energy efficiency legislation. To contribute to 
the debate and assist DG ENER in preparing a new 
Communication on ‘Energy Technologies in a future 
European Energy Policy’, this THINK report develops 
and discusses possible paths for a renewed EU energy 
technology policy towards 2050.
Energy technology policy comprises all measures that 
aim at promoting a selected set of energy technologies 
from early research to market deployment. Such a 
promotion typically leads to many overlaps with other 
policy areas. As different technologies show different 
environmental impacts, energy technology policy 
also relates to environmental policy. When selected 
technologies and projects are then supported at the 
basic research stage, technology policy intersects with 
science and innovation policy. And when certain 
technology sectors are promoted on the world market, 
technology policy influences industrial or even trade 
policy. In this report, we focus on energy technology 
policy in a narrow sense, in which policymakers 
can choose what technologies to promote, by what 
means, to which extent and for which period of 
time. Overlaps with other policy areas are referred to 
whenever needed.
The relation between technology and environmental 
policy, however, deserves special mentioning. The 
overarching EU climate policy goal is to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 80-95% below 
1990 levels by 2050. This goal also defines European 
energy technology policy towards 2050:  Given that 
a certain level of GHG emissions in non-energy 
sectors (such as agriculture) is not avoidable, the 
electricity sector has to be decarbonized by an ever 
higher degree. Besides, an electrification of other 
sectors such as transportation or heating and cooling 
– even though pace and extent are uncertain – will 
result in an increased role of electricity in final energy 
consumption. 
There are doubts that the mix of currently 
implemented policy measures can deliver cost-
efficient decarbonization. With the exception of 
the EU ETS, most policy schemes – as for instance 
various means to support renewable energy sources 
(RES) or existing financial support to innovation 
– are implemented at national levels. The Strategic 
Energy Technology (SET) Plan, generally perceived 
as the “technology pillar” of the EU energy and 
climate policy, offers a first instrument and attempt 
to explicitly target a common EU energy technology 
policy. However, it expires by 2020. Limitations 
regarding existing policies’ efficiency and effectiveness 
are costly, as the scope of energy technology policy is 
large. The 2011 Capacities Map published by the JRC 
reveals that around EUR 3bn are spent annually on 
non-nuclear low-carbon energy R&D. About 70% is 
funded by the private sector. The major part of public 
funding is provided by Member States and only about 
20% by the EU, or 7% of the total EUR 3bn spent 
annually – which equals less than EUR 160mn per 
year (see Appendix 2). 
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Whereas energy technology paths to 2020 are 
roughly known, they are basically unknown for the 
post-2030 horizon. Several studies illustrate possible 
technology paths for decarbonization towards 2050. 
Most prominently, the EU Energy Roadmap proposes 
a variety of decarbonization scenarios and concludes, 
in line with other roadmaps (ECF, 2010; Greenpeace, 
2010; Eurelectric, 2011; IEA, 2012), that 2050 is 
technologically feasible. A wide set of technologies 
can contribute to decarbonization, including 
consumption-oriented measures increasing energy 
efficiency and decreasing overall consumption; and 
production-oriented technologies, comprising low-
carbon generation (RES, nuclear) and decarbonized 
fossil fuels (CCS). All 2050 roadmaps have one 
element in common: significant improvements in 
energy efficiency and grids play a crucial role. Hence, 
on the supply side, three key variables remain, the 
shares of RES, CCS and nuclear.
Uncertainty in choosing viable decarbonization 
technologies, however, does not only stem from 
EU-internal factors. Also technology development 
outside the EU, or the global financial crisis, influence 
the success of European decarbonization efforts. 
Whatever way taken, it is of greatest importance 
to achieve decarbonization in a cost-efficient way, 
to foster European competitiveness in R&D and 
manufacturing of low-carbon technologies, and to 
ensure growth at a time when governments are forced 
to curtail public spending. Successful innovation on 
the world market will help to decrease costs to reach 
2050 objectives and make technologies needed to do 
so a good business case, creating employment and 
growth. 
The remainder of this report is structured as follows. 
Section 2 first introduces economic rationales for 
policy intervention and EU involvement in energy 
technology policy, before discussing the need to 
re-think currently implemented policies. Section 3 
illustrates possible future policy paths for a new EU 
energy technology policy, discusses the role of the 
SET Plan and evaluates policy designs under each 
path within a multi-criteria approach. Using the 
findings of this evaluation, we discuss implications 
for a renewed, post-2020 SET Plan in Section 4. We 
derive technology-specific recommendations based 
on a policy evaluation, but also based on a discussion 
on what happens if assumptions, as for instance 
regarding future technological developments, are 
relaxed. Moreover, we present other no-regret 
measures that hold for any future technology policy. 
Section 5 concludes.
2. Do we need a (new) (EU) energy 
technology policy?
In this section, we first discuss why there is a need 
for any policy intervention in the area of energy 
technology development and deployment. Second, 
we justify the need for such policy intervention going 
beyond the national level. The final section then deals 
with the need to re-think currently implemented 
policies.  
2.1 Why an energy technology policy? 
There are at least four kinds of reasons for policy 
intervention, including (i) the environmental 
externality, (ii) innovation externalities, (iii) capital 
market imperfections, and (iv) increasing global 
competition in green-tech sectors. Policy intervention, 
hence, can be motivated by market failures on the one 
hand (as for (i), (ii), and (iii)) or by strategic industry 
and trade policy issues (as for (iv)) on the other.
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The environmental externality
The emission of greenhouse gases involves a negative 
externality. Emitters cause climate change and, thus, 
impose costs not only on themselves but on the whole 
population and future generations. The reduction of 
emissions, consequently, is a global public good and 
unless such reduction is adequately rewarded, or the 
damaging emissions properly charged, the incentive 
to develop and deploy low-carbon technologies will 
be too low. From a global perspective, a common, 
comprehensive, global carbon price would be 
the economically efficient instrument, inducing 
emission reductions wherever they are cheapest 
and minimizing abatement costs across all sectors 
(Stern, 2006). For a discussion of the relative merits 
of different carbon pricing schemes see Grubb/
Newbery (2007) or Goulder/Parry (2008). But, in 
the absence of such internalization of environmental 
externalities, further policy intervention, in matters 
of energy technology for example, is needed.
Innovation externalities
Most low-carbon technologies are not yet competitive 
or even not technically proven. All fundamental and 
a part of applied knowledge gained from research 
activities is a public good – without a very restrictive 
access regime, innovating firms cannot fully 
appropriate the returns from their RD&D activities 
due to existing social, market and/or network 
spillover effects.1 A similar appropriability problem 
also can arise for technology deployment with later 
adopters benefitting from knowledge gains and 
1  Marginal social returns can be significantly 
higher than marginal private return to the innovator. Jaffe 
(1996) gives an excellent account of various market and 
technological spillovers arising from private innovation ac-
tivities. Martin and Scott (2000) and Foxon (2003) discuss 
market failures of low-carbon innovation. 
production cost decreases achieved by early adopters. 
Furthermore, there is a tension between the need to 
encourage private sector RD&D, which companies 
argue requires strong enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, with the public desire to make the 
resulting discoveries as widely available as possible so 
that they can be deployed at large scale. 
Without further public support, the level and timing 
of private investments in the development of new 
clean energy technologies will be socially suboptimal 
(see also Acemoglu et al., 2010). Companies tend to 
focus on innovations leading to more rapid or more 
secure pay-offs, even though an optimal innovation 
portfolio, from a societal point of view, might also 
include innovation projects that yield positive 
cash-flows only in the longer-run or with a lower 
profitability. While the potential market for green 
technologies is huge, the margins to be earned, even 
with an adequate carbon price, will likely be modest, 
as energy prices are limited by existing well-developed 
fossil options. Consequently, public support in the 
energy field will be far more important than for other 
sectors, where products do not face close substitutes. 
There are valid economic reasons for a technology 
policy that addresses the full spectrum from basic 
research and development to demonstration and 
early deployment.  
Capital market imperfections
In a perfect capital market, financial resources would 
be allocated to their most profitable uses. The accuracy 
of this allocation will depend on two factors, the 
availability of information, and the ability to interpret 
this information properly (Peneder, 2008). Real world 
settings, however, face problems of adverse selection 
(the innovator has better information about expected 
net benefits of a project than the investor who might 
4Final Report – January 2013
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finance it) and moral hazard (the innovator may 
change his behavior after the financing decision has 
been taken, e.g. increase the risk profile of the project). 
Innovations in clean energy technologies often pair 
very high capital requirements with substantial 
economic, technical and regulatory uncertainties – a 
situation that hampers access to finance. Moreover, 
many investors are constrained in (equity as well as 
debt) capital, not only due to the limited availability 
of funds as a result of the financial crisis, but also 
since certain actors face difficulties to raise available 
funds. There is evidence that especially small and 
new firms suffer from higher cost of capital than their 
larger, incumbent competitors (Hyytinen/Toivanen, 
2005). Transaction cost can be very (and actually 
too) high relative to the required financing volume. 
And also the timing of returns can be an issue. From 
an investor perspective it might take too long until 
any benefits can be monetized given also uncertainty 
regarding future adaptations of policy frameworks. 
This is further reinforced by the phenomenon that the 
private sector often tends to use a too high discount 
rate when evaluating R&D projects (Cohen/Noll, 
1991). Hence, there are again good economic reasons 
for policy intervention to reduce uncertainties, 
relax credit constraints and remove investment and 
financing barriers. 
Increasing global competition
The challenge Europe is facing today is “to remain 
at the forefront of the booming international market 
for energy technology” (EC, 2010, p. 15), at a time 
when Member States curtail public spendings. If 
decarbonization has no alternative but real potential 
gains from decreasing energy production- and 
supply costs only occur in the longer-run, growth 
effects stemming from the competitive production 
and profitable trade of low-carbon technologies on 
the world market are key to enhance growth in the 
shorter- to medium-term. Regarding wind energy, 
for instance, top-European turbine manufacturers 
such as Vestas, Siemens, or Gamesa saw a continuous 
reduction in their global market share. But it is 
predominantly European manufacturers that are 
active in the offshore wind market today, and there 
could be an argument to use this advantage of being a 
pioneer, and to benefit (i) from domestic technology 
adoption as well as (ii) from exporting the technology 
to non-European markets. Similarly, for solar PV 
China has become the ‘manufacturer of the world’. 
Manufacturing of cells and modules is a labor-
intensive process, and the performance and quality 
of Chinese products is comparable to European 
ones. But European firms still have a strong position 
in solar PV manufacturing equipment – high-tech 
products that are sold to Asian countries, too. 
2.2 Why an EU energy technology 
policy? 
Policy intervention can be governed by the EU, 
jointly coordinated among countries, or by individ-
ual Member States who seek to intervene mainly on 
their home market. The challenges we face, i.e. those 
accompanying the transition to a low-carbon, high-
reliability power system at acceptable social costs, 
are clearly European, and to rely only on individual 
Member State action is likely to lead to a sub-optimal 
outcome. From an institutional perspective, there are 
shared competences between Member States and the 
EU regarding the achievement of the European envi-
ronmental and energy policy goals (Art. 192 and 194, 
Treaty of the Functioning of the EU) as well as related 
to actions that ensure the conditions necessary for the 
competitiveness of the European industry (Art. 173). 
It is thus necessary to investigate whether there are 
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substantial economic benefits to be gained from a re-
newed EU involvement, but at the same time to set 
those benefits into relation with the costs of pooling 
public regulatory power at this highest political level.
Benefits from EU intervention can be expected from 
the coordination of national policies The currently 
implemented bottom-up approach with 20-20-20 
targets being specified in EU Directives that have to 
be implemented into national laws resulted in a wide 
set of national policy designs. Moreover, technology 
push initiated at the EU level can avoid an unneces-
sary duplication of national or regional initiatives 
which is especially relevant for technologies in the 
‘valley of death’, where substantial investments are 
required for commercial-scale demonstration and 
early deployment but projects are not yet viable in the 
short-term. Furthermore, most of the Member States 
simply are too small to implement certain instru-
ments or to compete on a global scale with economies 
such as the US or China; and when joint action is tak-
en, technology-, but also industry- and trade policies 
are more credible towards world market competitors, 
while also being more credible for attracting foreign 
investment. A common EU funding scheme can also 
avoid that Member States would only fund technolo-
gies that are produced within their own borders and 
free-ride on third countries to push other technolo-
gies. European co-funding can leverage additional 
national and private funds (EC, 2011d; JRC, 2011; 
Liljelund et al., 2011). And also for overcoming the 
financial crisis and relaxing funding constraints, the 
EU has to play its role, as the financial crisis clearly is 
a European problem asking for European solutions.
Following the principle of subsidiarity, EU action, 
however, shall only be taken when it is more effec-
tive than actions at national, regional, or local level. 
Potential drawbacks of EU involvement might be the 
disregard of national specificities, the reduction of in-
stitutional competition between alternative policy ap-
proaches, and the loss of decentralized ‘willingness to 
do more’. Considering the above arguments in favor 
of EU intervention, it becomes clear that they out-
weigh their costs for some policy areas where strong 
coordination is needed (such as the EU ETS). How-
ever, at the same time when EU regulations become 
themselves complex and alien to national habits, also 
transaction costs increase and might outweigh the 
benefits of EU intervention. Nonetheless, the above 
arguments indicate that no energy technology policy 
can work properly without a certain type or degree of 
EU governance.
2.3 Why a new EU energy technology 
policy?
In what follows, we discuss the need to re-think 
current policies. We consider limitations of the 
existing instruments that aim at correcting i) the 
environmental and ii) innovation externalities; and 
illustrate drawbacks of the current policy in reacting 
to iii) capital market imperfections, the EU financial 
crisis and institutional frictions, and iv) to increasing 
global competition. 
Limitations of existing policies addressing the 
environmental externality
One major instrument to address the environmental 
externality is carbon pricing. An EU-wide cap and 
trade system was introduced in 2003. The 2009 
climate and energy policy package strengthened 
legislation and extends the coverage of the EU ETS 
substantially.2 However, the EU ETS does not yet 
2  Directive 2009/29/EC considers a single EU-
wide cap on emission allowances from 2013 on, the step-
wise replacement of a free allocation by auctioning, and 
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deliver an adequate price signal (see e.g. Ellerman et al., 
2010; Schmidt et al., 2012; Martin et al., 2012). Prices 
are neither at a sufficiently high level nor reliable, but 
instead are argued to be too low and far from being 
predictable in the long-term. As a consequence, the 
UK Government in 2011 unilaterally introduced a 
price floor of GBP 16/ton – following a linear path 
up to GBP 30/ton in 2020. But the EU ETS is still a 
new instrument. Stern (2006) argues that the first 
two decades of its implementation will “be a period 
of transition” before “carbon pricing is universal and 
automatically factored into decision making” (p. xix). 
Regarding non-ETS sectors, carbon emission 
reduction targets have been centrally set within the 
Effort Sharing Agreement (EC, 2009). The decision 
on policy instruments to implement has been left to 
the Member States, though carbon taxes are expected 
to play a major role. The proposal of a new Energy 
Taxation Directive provides a framework for the 
adoption of a tax comprising both an energy-and a 
GHG emissions component. Minimum carbon tax 
levels of EUR 20/t CO2 are proposed for several 
energy products. Apart from this, a few European 
countries have already imposed specific taxes on 
the CO2 content of energy products. Finland and 
Sweden, for instance, introduced a special tax in the 
1990s. After a long debate in 2009, Ireland introduced 
a carbon tax as a component of a general package of 
fiscal consolidation. Thus, there is wide heterogeneity 
among national policies; some Member States even 
have certain fossil fuel subsidies in place due to 
various political reasons and national implicit tax 
rates on energy vary substantially (Pazienza et al., 
2011).   
an enlarged list of activities and GHGs covered. Decision 
2010/634/EU sets the total EU-wide amount of allowances 
at 2,039mn for 2013. The cap will decrease by 1.74% per 
year, with this factor scheduled to be reviewed by 2020.
Besides carbon pricing, Directive 2009/28/EC on the 
promotion of renewable energy sources (RES) sets 
binding national targets for the share of RES in gross 
final energy consumption by 2020. Member States 
have full autonomy in developing their national 
action plans and in the choice of policy measures. 
Implemented support instruments include (a) feed-
in tariff (FIT) schemes which guarantee a certain 
price for a specific period of time or predetermined 
amount of production; (b) feed-in premiums (FIP) 
guaranteeing a certain add-on to the market price; or 
(c) quota obligations with tradable green certificates 
(TGC), a quantity-based instrument where either 
producers or suppliers of energy are obliged to have 
a specific share of RES in their portfolio. Besides, 
tenders may be used in combination with the above 
instruments, such as tenders for a fixed FIT where 
potential investors bid the required support level. 
Several studies assess the performance of alternative 
policy instruments (e.g. Jacobsson et al., 2009 or 
Ragwitz et al., 2011 and references therein). Ecofys et 
al. (2011) provide a detailed overview on implemented 
RES support policies in Europe (see also Appendix 
3). Price-control schemes with guaranteed access to 
the grid seem to be a prominent tool (Fouquet, 2013). 
Furthermore, countries typically have implemented 
a whole set of instruments, differentiating among 
technology types and installation sizes and being 
adapted regularly. A complete re-orientation of 
policy schemes, as happened in Italy where in 2002 
a TGC scheme has substituted a FIT policy, is rather 
an exception than the rule.3 In this vein, Kitzing et al. 
(2012) find indications for a bottom-up convergence 
of policy choice. Indeed, the Commission expressed 
lately that “a greater convergence of national support 
schemes to facilitate trade and move towards a 
3  In 2005, a FIT scheme for solar electricity called 
“conto energia” was launched again in Italy and had been 
revised several times until the 5th conto energia in 2012.
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more pan-European approach to development of 
renewable energy sources must be pursued” (EC, 
2011b, p. 11).4 In any case, Directive 2009/28/EC has 
been designed to ensure the achievement of the 2020 
RES target. However, this may not in itself promote 
the necessary long-term investments to also achieve 
2050 decarbonization objectives. 
Regarding energy efficiency, the third column 
of the EU energy and climate policy package, the 
Parliament gave a green light to the new Energy 
Efficiency Directive in September 2012. Member 
States did agree on an indicative target of 20% energy 
savings and to several binding measures.5 Besides, 
other relevant pieces of legislation imposing various 
standards and obligations include Directive 2010/31/
EC on the energy performance of buildings, the 
Energy Labelling Directive 2010/30/EC and Directive 
2009/125/EC establishing a framework for the 
setting of ecodesign requirements for energy-related 
products.
4  Evaluating responses to a public consultation on 
the implications of non-harmonized RES support schemes, 
CEER (2012) presents opinions on that issue as well. Pro-
ponents of harmonized support schemes argue that har-
monization would avoid distortions in competition and 
instead create a level-playing field allocating RES produc-
tion to areas “with best available and most cost-efficient 
resources and grid connection” (p. 14) whereas other 
stakeholders point on the key advantage of a decentralized 
approach of allowing individual Member States to tailor 
support schemes to their specific conditions.
5  These include the fact that energy companies 
are requested to reduce their energy sales to industry and 
residential sector by at least 1.5% p.a.; a 3% renovation rate 
for public buildings and an obligation to develop national 
roadmaps on how to make the entire buildings sector more 
energy efficient by 2050.
Limitations of existing policies addressing innovation 
externalities
The EU’s Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan 
has been adopted in 2008 as the so called ‘technology 
pillar’ of the EU energy and climate policy that aims at 
accelerating the development and deployment of low-
carbon technologies. Its implementation started with 
the establishment of the European Industrial Initiatives 
(EIIs) which bring together industry, the research 
community, Member States and the Commission. 
Within these Initiatives, strategic objectives have 
been formulated based on Technology Roadmaps that 
identify priority actions for the decade from 2010 to 
2020. More specific Implementation Plans, containing 
more detailed descriptions of proposed RD&D 
activities, as well as suggestions about potential 
funding sources, are developed regularly for three-
year periods.
The SET Plan has been a successful initiative with 
respect to (i) information exchange by providing a 
common platform for industry, academia, Member 
States, and the EC; (ii) more coordinated planning by 
identifying priorities and action plans within EIIs and 
European Technology Platforms; and (iii) the joining of 
forces between private and public sectors and research 
community as well as between different Member States 
and/or stakeholders, within for instance the European 
Energy Research Alliance. Now, this instrument has to 
proof to be helpful also in successfully implementing 
formulated research and innovation plans.
However, the SET Plan in its current formulation – with 
the objective to “support the achievement of 2020 goals” 
has a limited time horizon. In addition, it is based on a 
within-sector approach regarding planning and priority 
setting. Hence, this current policy does not necessarily 
support an optimal (cost-efficient) portfolio of low-
carbon technologies, i.e. decarbonization at least cost. 
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Furthermore, a sustainable energy technology policy 
will need to react to the new context given the EU and 
financial crises and increasing global competition in 
green-tech markets. 
Technology push in the form of direct support to 
innovation can involve a whole set of financing 
instruments. Such instruments are indeed policy 
instruments (Olmos et al., 2011). In addition to 
their function of closing the gap between the cost of 
innovation and funds private parties are willing to 
contribute, they (i) might be able to target specific 
technologies (e.g. public loans/guarantees, public 
equity, subsidies in the form of technology prizes); 
(ii) show a certain flexibility in (re-) directing funds 
to alternative innovation projects (e.g. lower for public 
loans than for subsidies in the form of benefits related 
to RD&D investments); and (iii) typically are better 
suited to support certain types of innovating entities. 
As illustrated in the ‘Carvalho Report’ (European 
Parliament, 2010), the EU Framework Programmes 
have been powerful mechanisms for catalyzing RD&D 
and accelerating the development, demonstration 
and deployment of low-carbon technologies, 
and to implement the SET Plan. Nevertheless, 
many stakeholders criticize that FP7 is, “despite 
the improvements made in relation to FP6, still 
characterized by excessive bureaucracy […] and 
undue delays” (p. 4). The report moreover complains 
about a lack of global orientation and recommends 
a further internationalization for the future through 
active cooperation with non-European countries. 
Current practice also shows that subsidies in the form 
of grants and contracts – the most attractive form of 
support from the innovators’ perspective, but also the 
Box 1: EU funding to energy RD&D and innovation
Annual EU budgets are prepared in the context of multi-
annual financial frameworks. The next period will begin in 
2014 and intensive discussions on spending priorities are 
ongoing. 
Research funding is organized through Framework Pro‑
grammes. For the current FP7, the total budget increased 
substantially to EUR 50bn compared to 18bn for FP6, with 
certain sums dedicated to energy (2.35bn), environment 
(1.89bn) and Euratom (2.7bn). These numbers represent a 
clear increase over past budgets, but in relative terms the 
share of energy did continuously decrease over time. Hori‑
zon 2020 will be the new EU funding program for research 
and innovation running from 2014 to 2020 with a total 
budget of EUR 80bn. It will combine all existing research 
and innovation funding through FPs and the innovation-
related activities of the Competitiveness and Innovation 
Framework Programme and the European Institute of In-
novation and Technology. 
The Intelligent Energy Europe facility, launched in 2003 and 
running until 2013, aims at promoting energy efficiency 
and RES with a total budget of EUR 727mn during its sec-
ond phase covering 2007-2013. The major part of the fund 
is made available through annual calls. Moreover, EUR 9bn 
are distributed as part of cohesion policy. The European In‑
vestment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development provide low-interest loans. 
The European Energy Programme for Recovery is a short-
term measure that was set up in 2009 as a response to 
the financial crisis. With a budget of EUR 4bn it aims at co-
financing projects in the areas of gas and electricity infra-
structure (2.3bn), offshore wind (565mn) and CCS (1bn), 
which without such additional EU funding likely would be 
delayed, downsized or even cancelled. Funds that had not 
been used by 31.12.2010 have been transferred into the 
European Energy Efficiency Fund (EUR 125mn  comple-
mented by 75mn from the EIB, 60mn from Cassa Depositi 
e Prestiti and 5mn from Deutsche Bank) that offers differ-
ent types of debt and equity instruments.
A new source of EU funds has been the NER300. Within the 
EU ETS, 300mn emission allowances are set aside in the 
New Entrants’ Reserve. The instrument is managed jointly 
by the EC, the EIB and Member States. Projects developers 
apply to the Member State in which the project would be 
situated. Each Member State selects a set of projects from 
the applications and passes it to the EIB, where proposals 
then are evaluated and selected.
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most expensive one for the public sector – are, by far, 
the preferred policy instruments to fund clean energy 
innovation of any type.6
Limitations of existing policies addressing the EU 
financial crisis and market liquidity 
The EU and financial crises has severe consequences 
on the ability to mobilize private (both company inter-
nal and external) and especially public funds. As a con-
sequence of the recent developments in credit markets 
and regulatory measures that have been implemented 
accordingly,7 it has become increasingly difficult to ac-
cess long-term financing, especially for projects with 
a high investment volume, as is the case for many en-
ergy innovation and demonstration projects. In ad-
dition, the current period of austerity has imposed 
tight fiscal constraints on national budgets and forces 
governments to re-think fiscal policies. They are re-
considering what their countries can afford in terms 
of low-carbon energy technology support. Different 
countries, such as Greece, France or the UK, have cut 
RES subsidies substantially (Gilder Cooke, 2012). 
6  Even though there is an increasing interest from 
(private and public) venture capital investors in green tech-
nologies, their role will probably remain a minor one also 
in the future (Lester/Hart, 2012). Venture capital funds 
typically do not exceed a few hundred million EUR, and an 
individual project investment does not exceed about EUR 
10mn which is quite low for energy (especially demonstra-
tion) projects. Besides, equity investors tend to exit after a 
period of about 10 years and a market with exit options is 
an important precondition.
7  Basel III as a global regulatory standard on 
bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market liquidity 
strengthens capital requirements and introduces new regu-
latory requirements on liquidity and leverage. EU Direc-
tive 2009/138/EC codifies and harmonizes EU insurance 
regulation and amongst others sets standards regarding the 
amount of capital that insurance companies must hold to 
reduce the risk of insolvency.
The crisis has affected all Member States, but not all in 
the same way and to the same extent, which exposes 
the EU to the danger of braking into new informal 
zones. Less affected countries, mostly in northern 
Europe, have entirely different starting position for 
decarbonization policies than more affected Member 
States, mostly in southern Europe. Germany or the 
Netherlands, for instance, could keep employment 
relatively stable whereas other countries like Spain saw 
increases in unemployment rates by about 15 percent-
age points (EC, 2011c). Hence, on the one hand, there 
are a few countries, such as Germany or the Nether-
lands, which can benefit from relatively low financing 
cost, public funding opportunities and a quite high 
consumer willingness to pay for energy policy. On the 
other hand, there are many countries that suffer from 
extremely high financing cost, highly limited public 
funds, and consumers not willing, or able, to afford 
low-carbon technology support. As will be discussed 
later in-depth, this obviously will have an impact on 
the feasibility of any centralized energy technology 
policy at EU level. 
A first policy response to these challenges has been the 
European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEPR), 
a EUR 4bn program that was set up in 2009 to boost 
Europe’s economic recovery by “stimulating economic 
activity and promoting growth and job creation” (EC, 
2012b, p. 2; see Box 1). However, given the complex-
ity and magnitude of the crises, much more action is 
needed to keep low-carbon RD&D and innovation on 
track towards 2020 and 2050. 
Limitations of existing policies addressing increased 
global competition
Europe must not be regarded in isolation. Third 
countries built strong competitive positions in 
RD&D and manufacturing of different low-carbon 
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technologies and European players suffer from 
substantially reduced market shares in e.g. the solar PV 
or onshore wind turbine sectors. As also highlighted in 
the most recent Competitiveness Report (EC, 2011c), 
global competition has become much tougher and 
the need to remain competitive on the world market 
has become more important. For Europe to be a 
beneficiary in the low-carbon market, rather than just 
a consumer of technologies developed elsewhere, there 
is no alternative to putting innovation at the heart of its 
growth strategy. 
At one extreme of an industrial policy stands the 
proactive state, on the other extreme, authorities that 
minimize public intervention but build on competition 
and free trade. Changing conditions on the world 
market for clean technologies might provide further 
justifications for policy measures that strengthen 
the power of European players in order to keep a 
competitive advantage, build industrial leadership and 
attract foreign capital. There are different arguments 
backing government intervention under certain 
circumstances. For instance, the presence of increasing 
returns to scale and imperfect competition in a sector 
can provide a rationale for supporting the domestic 
industry to raise national welfare (Krugman, 1987). 
Europe strongly values open markets and free 
competition. In the recent past, however, some 
voices call for actions supporting European players in 
keeping pace with its international competitors. In a 
recent Communication (EC, 2012), six “Key Enabling 
Technologies” (KETs, e.g. advanced materials or 
advanced manufacturing technologies) have been 
identified which is a first step towards explicitly 
focusing and prioritizing specific industrial sectors. 
These KETs have been recognized as cross-cutting 
technologies, feeding into many different industrial 
value chains and enabling a wide range of product 
applications, including those related to the transition 
towards a low-carbon economy. However, the need for 
trade and industry policy intervention in the energy 
sector and at European level has to be discussed with 
care and in recognition of current trade legislations. 
2.4 Main findings 
There is a need for public support to correct for market 
failures originating from the environmental- and 
innovation externalities, to account for capital market 
imperfections and to fully exploit international trade 
opportunities in clean technologies. There further is a 
need for EU involvement to coordinate market failure 
corrections between Member States and to bundle 
national forces. And there is a need to re-think current 
policies to correct for limitations of existing policy 
measures, to give a clear and stable vision for the 
post-2020 period, and at the same time to reinforce 
European competitiveness in low-carbon technology 
sectors on the global market and take into account the 
changed context. 
Hence, there are three challenges for any future 
EU technology policy: (i) to rule out limitations in 
existing policies and provide a framework for the 
post-2020 period, (ii) to enhance green growth, and 
(iii) to be robust with respect to EU financial crises 
and institutional frictions. These challenges constitute 
efficiency criteria for our following policy evaluation: 
- Climate-effectiveness: Does the policy deliver 
decarbonization by 2050?
- Green growth: Does the policy enable green 
growth? Does it respond to fierce global 
competition in green-tech markets?
- Robustness to EU financial crises and 
institutional difficulties: Is the policy robust with 
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respect to EU financial crises and institutional 
frictions? Will the policy be robust to financing 
gaps and/or to a future potential lack of 
governance resulting from institutional frictions 
on the way towards 2050?
Since all benefits that increase the effectiveness of 
future policies come at certain costs, and in addition, 
differ regarding potential difficulties related to their 
implementation, we further add:
- Cost-efficiency: Does the policy achieve climate 
and growth goals at lowest costs? 
- Implementability: Is the policy politically 
and institutionally feasible? Which barriers to 
implementation are expected?
In what follows we discuss the role of the SET Plan and 
its corresponding technology push within different 
possible EU energy policy paths. We rely on the 
five criteria above to evaluate each of these settings. 
3. Possible paths for a new EU 
energy technology policy 
To capture the broad spectrum of policy options, this 
section develops and discusses opposing paths for a 
future EU energy technology policy that can pave the 
way towards 2050. 
3.1  Possible policy paths
3.1.1 Policy instruments
Two broad classes of instruments can be used to 
accelerate innovation, demonstration and deployment 
of low-carbon technologies. First, market pull 
instruments mainly address the positive externalities 
of clean energy production and shall incentivize 
deployment of and innovation in low-carbon 
technologies. A general distinction can be made 
among instruments building on price signals (such as 
carbon pricing) and instruments incentivizing via the 
definition of binding quantitative targets (such as the 
national targets for RES shares in gross final energy 
consumption by 2020). Second, technology push 
mainly targets the correction of positive externalities 
related to spillover effects during the innovation 
process. Besides monetary transfers, technology push 
might also shift financial risks from entrepreneurs to 
public authorities by guaranteeing financial support 
in case research for innovation does not turn out to 
be successful or scalable for market implementation. 
Again, a distinction among two classes of instruments 
can be made. Push can either be directed (such as 
EEPR funds dedicated to support offshore wind and 
CCS demonstration projects) or, in contrast, can 
involve technology-neutral support to innovation. 
Innovation in the 2050 context does not merely focus 
on entirely new inventions. Instead, it also entails 
applied research to improve existing technologies, 
to manufacture next generation non-fossil energy 
production and to advance efficient network- and 
consumption technologies (Rametsteiner/Weiss, 
2006). Figure 1 depicts a simplified illustration of the 
innovation chain and characterizes each step in terms 
of its investment needs and types of risks and returns. 
Whereas technical risks are dominant in the very early 
stages of the innovation chain and innovators’ main 
concern is the financing of the research activities; 
political and commercial risks become more and 
more relevant as technologies evolve along the chain. 
There is a consensus in energy technology policy 
literature that market pull alone does not lead to 
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the desired outcomes (Horbach, 2007; Nemet, 2009; 
Jones/Glachant, 2010). A well-designed policy 
instead involves pull such as a carbon price to deal 
with the environmental externality, and, at the same 
time, technology push to deal with the knowledge 
and spillover externalities. The relative importance 
of market pull to technology push decreases as 
one moves from technologies close to market 
competitiveness towards highly immature ones 
(Grubb, 2004). Especially the central stages of the 
value chain, commercial-scale demonstration and 
early deployment, involve substantial investment 
needs accompanied by still non-negligible risks. 
This “valley of death”, where the key challenge is 
the transition from publicly co-financed to private 
operations, is discussed in-depth elsewhere (e.g. 
Murphy/Edwards, 2003). 
Each of the above instruments can theoretically be 
implemented in a decentralized way, with Member 
States designing national action plans and introducing 
a set of related policy measures. An example is the 
current practice regarding renewable support policies, 
where it is the responsibility of national governments 
to achieve RES targets for 2020, who then support 
an individual mix of low-carbon technologies by 
implementing measures like feed-in tariffs or a 
scheme of tradable green (or white) certificates and 
by providing support to technology development in 
the form of research grants, tax incentives, etc. In 
contrast, policy action can also be coordinated at a 
cross-national level with the EU taking an active role 
(e.g. the EU ETS, cross-national planning and priority 
setting as within the Industrial Initiatives of the SET 
Plan, or EU research funds). 
Hence, policy paths consist of three elements:
(1) Market pull instruments framing the context for 
technology push by a) creating markets via strong 
price signals and/or b) providing signals through 
quantitative targets;
(2) Technology push instruments: a) directed 
technology push and/or b) technology-neutral 
support to innovation; 
(3) Governance of these instruments: 
a) decentralized national action and/or b) 
centralized, cross-national action with EU 
involvement. 
In the following, we introduce three possible future 
pathways for an EU energy technology policy. From 
a reference case, we can depart in two major ways: in 
line with options for a post-2020 RES policy outlined 
Figure 1: Simplified innovation chain and relative importance of technology push and market pull
Source: Own depiction
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in a recent Communication on renewable energy 
(EC, 2012d), it can either be prices or quantitative 
targets that give the key signals to innovate and invest 
in clean technologies.8 Starting from this distinction 
and different paths of market pull framing the 
context for energy technology policies, for each 
case the respective role of the SET Plan and optimal 
technology push are discussed. 
3.1.2 Policy path 1: Reference case
The first policy path determines a reference case and 
implies that 2020 policies would be improved and 
extended to 2030 and 2050. This option is based on 
a mix of incentives coming from carbon pricing and 
quantitative target setting. As in the current 2020 
policy, with both the EU ETS and EU-wide targets 
for RES and improvements in energy efficiency, along 
with national energy policies to meet corresponding 
national targets, a wide set of market pull instruments 
prevails. For similar reasons as today (interactions 
between policies, ETS and subsidies annihilating each 
other), the carbon price will only provide a relatively 
weak investment and innovation signal. 
The SET Plan would be further developed and 
expanded, resulting in at least as much as the current 
nine Industrial Initiatives that can provide the basis 
for information exchange and research prioritization. 
Therefore, SET Plan support will continue to be of a 
rather broad nature and not be unanimously focused 
on and aligned with more specific technology targets. 
Besides Industrial Initiatives, Technology Platforms 
and EERA, also competitive technology- and research 
8  This basic distinction between price and quantity 
signals was first studied by Weitzman (1974), who stresses 
that differences between them can only be due to asym-
metric information between firms and their governing 
regulatory entities, and that in many cases indeed a mix of 
both can be applied.
funds, similar to past and current Framework 
Programmes, will be continuously relied upon. Both, 
technology-specific push but also competitive funds, 
coming from EU and national sources, are prevailing 
as technology push instruments. 
Hence, the governance of instruments remains, just 
as in the 2020 policy, mixed with elements managed 
at national and cross-national levels and continues 
a policy of multiple means and actors. The EU will 
by design have to govern and coordinate the ETS. 
However, with targets and national action plans 
coexisting, Member State action will play a major 
role in shaping the energy mix. Notably, there are 
centralized means such as EU-level funding programs, 
cross-national research alliances and Industrial 
Initiatives, as well as decentralized instruments 
regarding non-ETS carbon pricing, RES support 
policies, or e.g. national support to innovation.
3.1.3 Policy path 2: Strong carbon price and 
focus on price signals
Starting point for the second policy path is a strong 
carbon price signal. Here we assume perfectly adjusted 
ETS and according non-ETS prices that mirror in a 
single, adequate and reliable carbon price covering 
most, if not all, GHG emissions. Such a carbon price 
would then be the major driver of innovation in clean 
technologies and for decarbonization. Sectoral targets 
cease after 2020, and from then on, the market will 
react to the carbon price alone. Additional national 
support schemes might co-exist; however, the strong 
carbon price will decrease the necessity of ambitious 
individual Member State actions. 
Technology push plays a rather accommodating 
role to lift promising technologies from R&D to 
commercialization and preliminarily would rely on 
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technology-neutral financial support to innovation, 
and, thus, on competition for funds among different 
technologies and innovation projects. While the 
carbon price enhances decarbonization technologies 
that are discovered by the market, promising projects 
at the early stages of such technology developments 
can obtain additional public funding. Such funding 
will be granted only until market incentives take over 
at later stages. After having delivered its initial push, 
the SET Plan as an instrument to prioritize among 
technologies and projects ceases by 2020. It will 
rather function in a ‘light’ version as a platform for 
open access information exchange (on e.g. the status 
quo of technologies, costs, experience with pilots, 
etc.) and stakeholder coordination and cooperation. 
Hence, it will preliminary become a tool that (i) can 
help potential innovators and investors to take the 
right decisions and (ii) can help to mobilize private 
funds (e.g. banks or pension funds can judge better 
into which kinds of projects to invest).
The governance of instruments will have to be 
predominantly centralized and administered by the 
EU since the key instrument in this path would be 
a strong, EU-wide carbon price. Technology push 
could potentially be administered and funded by both 
the EU and Member States with centralized funding 
programs and individual national funding schemes 
co-existing. For this policy, there is also a possibility 
for the EU to generate its own source of income which 
could be made available to implement such funding 
methods: parts of the income generated through the 
auctioning of allowances could be collected centrally 
and be redistributed for coordinated RD&D support.
Table 1: Summary of policy paths
Policy path 1:
Reference
Policy path 2:
Strong carbon price
Policy path 3:
Weak carbon price
Market pull (MP)
Key signal through price or quan-
titative target?
Hybrid Strong carbon price Sectoral targets
Technology push (TP)
Directed or technology-neutral?
Hybrid Predominantly technolo-
gy-neutral TP
Predominantly   directed 
TP
Governance of MP and TP 
instruments
Centralized or decentralized?
Hybrid Predominantly  centralized
Predominantly decen-
tralized
SET Plan BAU Light Advanced
Open access information  
platform x x x
Stakeholder coordination and  
cooperation platform x x
x
(going also beyond Euro-
pean borders)
Planning and priority setting 
(more informal, i.e. not legally 
binding)
x
(within sectors)
x
(across sectors)
Basis for allocation of public 
funds (esp. EU funds) (x) x
Basis for target setting (formal, i.e. 
legally binding) x
Source:: Own depiction
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3.1.4 Policy path 3: Weak carbon price and 
sectoral targets
Starting point for the third policy path is the presence 
of a very weak carbon price signal. Incentives for 
innovation and technology deployment here will 
mainly originate from quantitative sectoral targets – 
with sectors being understood as specific low-carbon 
technologies – that provide stable signals to industry, 
consumers and finance sectors as to what technologies 
will be prioritized on. In the updated business-as-
usual scenario of policy path 1, those targets were 
less focused and, in line with the 2020 SET Plan, did 
support almost the full range of technologies. In this 
policy path 3, the technology push will be specific to 
the most promising technologies, be it consumption- 
or production oriented. These targets would be long-
term objectives and can, depending on the degree of 
their exact specification, aim at intermediate steps 
in 2030 and 2040, or directly at the 2050 horizon. 
The strong and binding EU-level and corresponding 
national targets will be jointly agreed upon by the 
Member States at the EU level, taking into account 
also region-specific technological potentials and 
cost. Their implementation then will occur under 
individual governments’ responsibility. National 
action plans provide Member States with a degree of 
freedom for their own national implementation. 
Major technology push will come from an extended 
SET Plan, which focusses on more narrowly selected 
technologies. This ‘advanced’ SET Plan would attempt 
to find a future proof technology portfolio by using 
a cross-sector approach that provides clear signals to 
investors but leaves national authorities with sufficient 
leeway in implementation. The SET Plan, thus, will 
not only serve as a platform for information exchange 
and stakeholder coordination and cooperation, but 
also provide the basis for planning and priority (as well 
as target) setting and the determination of an optimal 
portfolio of low-carbon technologies, as well as for 
the allocation of public (especially European) funds. 
Technology-specific, directed financial support will 
be a key element in the concept of this policy design. 
Competitive funds for clean technologies might co-
exist, but will play a minor role. 
The governance of policy instruments, hence, will be 
predominantly decentralized. While the EU has to 
play a role in administering the ETS and moderating 
Member States’ decisions on sectoral targets, the 
implementation of this policy mainly relies on 
decentralized national action. There is the possibility 
of aligning national implementation: national action 
plans and support schemes could be harmonized 
throughout Member States and be aligned to the 
defined sectoral targets. 
3.1.5 Main findings 
The presented policy paths indicate the wide range of 
potential policy frameworks. The role of the SET Plan 
will differ depending on the future policy path. For 
path 2, a light SET Plan will function as a platform for 
open access information exchange and stakeholder 
coordination and cooperation. Hence, it will 
preliminary become a tool that supports innovators’ 
and investors’ decision making and that can help to 
mobilize private funds. In contrast, for path 3, an 
advanced SET Plan would also be a tool to determine 
an optimal portfolio of low-carbon technologies and 
research activities across sectors, and, thus, provide 
the basis for planning and priority (as well as target) 
setting and for an optimal allocation of public funds. 
Table 1 summarizes the key drivers and governance 
of instruments as well as the role of the SET Plan in 
the three possible future directions of an EU energy 
technology policy.
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3.2 Evaluation of policies
The following multi-criteria evaluation is used to elicit 
trade-offs among alternative policies. We do not use 
our findings to globally rank policies, since the absence 
of an objective procedure for weighting competing 
criteria restricts the possibilities for a scientifically 
robust ranking. But identifying trade-offs will allow 
us to provide feasible and individually tailored real 
world policies that base on different elements of each 
policy path. In Section 4.4 we also present no-regret 
measures (e.g. related to the mobilization of funds or 
the optimal design of public support to innovation) 
that are relevant for any energy technology policy 
and, therefore, not part of the multi-criteria analysis. 
3.2.1 Climate effectiveness
If all GHG emissions are included into a cap-and-
trade scheme, as would be the case in a very strict 
version of policy path 2, the decarbonization target 
would be reached by definition. Climate effectiveness 
will be less predictable for a scheme where part 
of the emissions are not included into the trading 
mechanism but are subject to a carbon price in 
the form of an emission tax. For such price-based 
instruments, the aggregate emission reduction 
quantity will be a response of market players to the 
tax and, hence, can only be estimated ex-ante. Climate 
efficiency will also be less predictable for policies 1 
and 3, which, besides a relatively weak carbon pricing 
scheme build on complementary target setting. The 
ETS here covers only a small subset of emissions. 
Policy makers cannot be sure which exact amount of 
abatement will be induced and a certain under- (or 
even over-) achievement of the emission reduction 
target may occur. 
Hence, with respect to climate effectiveness, policy 
path 2 seems to be slightly preferable to paths 1 and 3. 
However, with such a long time horizon, predictions 
about the exact outcome in 2050 are hardly possible 
and the problem will rather lie in achieving cost-
efficient abatement, which is discussed below. It has to 
be noted, though, that different simulation exercises 
provide strong arguments for early action and that 
“tackling climate change is the pro-growth strategy” 
(Stern, 2006, p. ii). An alternative strand of literature 
(see e.g. Nordhaus, 2000), assumes that technologies 
mitigating climate change evolve spontaneously and 
argues that for high enough discount rates waiting 
might be optimal. However, Aghion et al. (2009b) or 
Kempfert and Schumacher (2005) illustrate that to 
employ cost-efficient clean technologies in the future, 
policymakers have to stimulate green innovation 
today. Energy technology policies should not only 
aim at achieving the 2050 target in the long-term, 
but aim at an ambitious emission reduction path as 
of now. 
3.2.2 Green growth
Global competition has become much tougher and 
as discussed above, an EU energy technology policy 
should ideally reinforce European competitiveness 
in low-carbon technology sectors and foster green 
growth. Besides some very first attempts to identify 
Key Enabling Technologies, policy path  1 does 
not present explicit remedies addressing these 
challenges. National initiatives in general also will 
not be sufficient because most of the Member States 
are too small to compete on a global scale with 
economies such as the US or China.
For the second policy path, departing from strong price 
signals, it would be the industry that should discover 
promising areas of innovation and public intervention 
would only be initiated when technologies are already 
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relatively close to the market. On the one hand, there 
are good arguments to build on market signals and 
private sector decisions. On the other hand, one could 
argue that there might be the risk that public support 
for innovation, that at the same time could foster 
green growth, might come too late. Being too late also 
implies missing out potential first mover advantages in 
globalized markets.
In contrast, policy 3 allows public authorities to ‘pick 
winners’ already in very early stages of the innovation 
chain, and governments or the EU can explicitly target 
those technologies where one can build (or keep) 
industrial leadership. Forces could be joined for instance 
at regional levels and EU-level support to innovation 
could be optimally applied. However, this strategy faces 
several risks. First, ‘wrong winning technologies’ might 
be targeted. There is a “widespread concern about 
the potential for policy makers to efficiently direct 
technological change in a welfare improving manner” 
(Johnstone/Hascic, 2010). Such winner-picking also 
might discourage potential innovators to explore new 
least-cost innovation. A second risk concerns potential 
institutional lock-in in the allocation of funds. Once 
projects for a certain technology are funded, it is hard 
to instantly change technology priorities, and such an 
unstable design would also shy away future investors. 
Lastly, policy 3 features the risk of a political lock-in. 
Once technologies are chosen, funded and there are 
rents to distribute, interested stakeholders might make 
it impossible in the political processes to shift funding 
to other technologies. 
Despite these risks inherent to policy 3, the strong 
reliance on technology push nevertheless offers a 
huge potential to stimulate green growth. Technology 
push can also be used to push innovation and growth 
within the EU, and even in selected Member States 
or regions. Under the EU ETS, in contrast, European 
consumers incentivize innovation on the world 
market by also making it more profitable to invest in 
green technologies outside the EU and then to sell 
products to companies operating under the emission 
trading scheme. 
3.2.3 Robustness to EU financial crises and in-
stitutional difficulties
An energy technology policy towards 2050 inherently 
bases on long-term targets. Therefore, such a policy 
should be robust to scarce financing caused by 
current (and possible future) financial crises and 
be consistent with future developments of the EU 
institutional system.
A first relevant aspect here is the ability of policy 
options to mobilize funds. The current situation 
does not create sufficient certainty for investors. As 
the current crisis shows, and Gilder/Cooke (2012) 
discuss, several highly indebted countries stop 
supporting RES. Investors might shy away from these 
countries for a considerable future time. Stakeholders 
furthermore argue that the (current) EU ETS price 
is far too low and volatile to yield stable investment 
signals. Policy path 3 with strong technology targets 
and strong accommodating technology push, in 
contrast, can not only provide stable investment 
signals, but can also be used within a stimulus package 
in times of crisis. The decentralized governance 
moreover allows for tailored national solutions, 
which can react to differing national needs, e.g. 
countries can choose their abatement channels and 
shift abatement costs across sectors. A policy building 
on price signals is inferior to path 3 since technology 
targets provide clearer signals to investors, especially 
during financial crises where capital is scarce. 
Second, one has to ask how the governance of 
these instruments can be deterred by potential EU 
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institutional difficulties, such as the current debt 
crisis, that leaves different Member States with 
different potentials in sticking to committed long-
run climate goals. The impact will depend on the 
(future) degree of heterogeneity among Member 
States. A higher degree of heterogeneity will speak in 
favor of decentralized solutions and hence for policy 
paths 1 and 3 for similar reasons as discussed above. 
For instance, the burden sharing related to strong 
performance standards in energy efficiency or for the 
achievement of technology targets in path 3 would 
allow for adjusting the burden of decarbonization 
among Member States, and thus seems to be the most 
robust to EU institutional frictions and financial 
crises.
3.2.4 Cost-efficiency
Given the fixed target of decarbonization, cost-
efficiency implies cost minimization. Abatement 
costs will be minimized by using the various 
abatement channels available. These channels include 
switching to cleaner inputs (e.g. fuel switching), 
installing abatement capital (e.g. cleaner production 
technology, or installing energy efficient appliances), 
or reducing the overall scale of production or 
respectively consumption. Obviously, abatement 
costs differ across firms, households and sectors, and 
hence, it cannot be cost-efficient if all actors simply 
had to abate the same emission levels, say x% of their 
historical emissions. Instead, one common price on 
emissions minimizes abatement costs, as was already 
pointed out by Baumol and Oates (1971). This directly 
illustrates cost advantages for policy path 2.9 
9  As Goulder/Parry (2008) emphasize, with high 
monitoring costs associated to emission pricing, its ben-
efits disappear, what also can reduce trading levels and 
increase abatement costs (Stavins, 1995). The inability to 
perfectly monitor policy implementation might also ex-
plain suspected over-allocation of permits during the ini-
Whether policy path 3 is preferred over the reference 
case will depend upon the exact specification of 
technology priorities. For both options one may 
doubt whether policy makers possess the required 
information to define targets that imply that the costs of 
such technology mixes are just in line with the benefits 
of abatement. At the same time, technology mandates 
do not engage all abatement channels but likely will miss 
out promising, cost-efficient abatement opportunities.
3.2.5 Implementability
Implementability and subsidiarity compatibility of 
policies also need to be considered, taking into con-
sideration the legal and institutional context. For the 
reference case, this is given. There are shared responsi-
bilities between the EU and Member States fully in line 
with the shared competences as defined in the Treaty 
of the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Centrally coor-
dinated instruments complement national action as 
already established. Various stakeholders have the op-
portunity to use platforms such as the Industrial Ini-
tiatives to cooperate, and the within-sector approach 
of planning and priority setting of the current type of 
SET Plan avoids that individual sectors feel disadvan-
taged. Moreover, past success in bringing stakeholders 
together, being pioneer in certain technological areas 
or having built a competitive advantage, support argu-
ments in favor of such a policy.
In contrast, policy path 2 can face substantial difficul-
ties related to its implementation. Europe cannot be 
treated as an isolated system but is part of increas-
ingly globalized markets. A strong carbon price will 
be reflected in higher energy prices. Firms outside 
the EU competing in the same markets, but not be-
ing subject to (any or similarly high) carbon prices 
tial phase of the EU ETS, as studied in Ellerman/Buchner 
(2008).
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would benefit from their price systems not reflect-
ing the full cost of environmental damage. This puts 
European products at a competitive disadvantage, at 
least in the short-run. Obviously, some sectors would 
be more affected than others, as will be the case for 
different EU Member States depending on their prod-
uct specializations and competitive advantages.10 Es-
pecially countries being specialized in carbon-inten-
sive products most likely will oppose a global strong 
carbon pricing scheme and will advocate exemptions 
for certain sectors or the free allocation of emission 
allowances to certain user groups, a scenario that is 
even more relevant with the current EU and finan-
cial crises raising the question whether such a policy 
would be affordable for all Member States. Hence, the 
incentives of policy makers might not be aligned with 
the optimal policy design from the society’s perspec-
tives, and this policy path would suffer from severe 
difficulties (a) to implement ‘high-enough’, adequate 
carbon price and (b) to include all GHG emissions 
into the scheme.
For policy path 3, there are certain barriers for imple-
mentation, as well. The definition of EU-level sectoral 
targets implies the determination of a kind of optimal 
portfolio of technologies for the mid- and longer-
term horizon and respectively prioritization among 
sectors and research areas based on an advanced 
SET Plan. But such an optimal portfolio only can be 
determined under quite strong assumptions (all rel-
evant information need to be available, functioning 
cross-sector and cross-country coordination) and 
one might question whether it is “possible to have a 
common definition for the whole of the EU, given the 
different structures of the national economies” (Ran-
ci, 2012, p. 115). Furthermore, sectors are to some 
10  See Ellerman et al. (2010) for evidence on the 
past impact of the EU ETS on the competitiveness of dif-
ferent industries. See Delgado (2007) for a discussion on 
the impact of the EU ETS on different economies. 
extent competing with each other and there prob-
ably will be strong opposition from those sectors that 
are afraid of losing relevance. Moreover, the imple-
mentation of this policy would involve difficulties to 
agree on sectoral targets (e.g. different Member States 
might favor different technologies) and to agree on 
a burden sharing among Member States. It also has 
to be considered that regular (re-)negotiations would 
be necessary to adapt (EU-level and national) targets 
and research priorities. Member States also are typi-
cally reluctant to give too much power to the EU. Ac-
cording to Art. 194 of the TFEU, decisions regarding 
the energy mix of a country are a national issue and 
the definition of sectoral targets will cause problems 
related to the subsidiarity problem (see Box 2).
A further aspect related to the feasibility and 
implementability of a policy relates to distributional 
impacts. Varying impacts of alternative policy 
instruments on different stakeholders or Member 
States can have important implications for 
considerations of fairness as well as for political 
opposition. On the producer side, as already 
mentioned above, European players might suffer 
from weakened positions on the global market if they 
are subject to strong carbon prices that are absent in 
other economies, and certain Member States would 
be more affected than others depending on the 
product specializations of their economies. However, 
the decision about whether to allocate emission 
allowances based on grandfathering or auctioning 
can have a significant effect on distributional burdens. 
With a free allocation, political feasibility is improved, 
whereas auctioning has the advantage that revenues 
could be used to finance reductions in existing, 
distortionary taxes (revenue recycling effect), or to 
provide RD&D funding. On the consumer side, the 
EU ETS and other market pull schemes such as feed-
in-tariffs set prices that are common to all (industrial) 
consumers, and are (to a large extent) passed to 
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end-users. Such common prices will likely hit lower 
income groups hardest. In contrast, technology 
push for prioritized sectors will to a large extent be 
tax-financed, and policy path 3 leaves more room to 
include social aspects into energy technology policy 
– within one Member State but also across countries.
3.2.6 Main findings 
The multi-criteria evaluation of the possible policy 
paths for an EU energy technology policy illustrates 
that a prioritization of policies is not straightforward. 
No single policy is clearly superior to the others. 
Different options perform best under different 
evaluation criteria. With respect to the EU Energy 
Roadmap, policy path 2 probably could pave the way 
towards a diversified technology portfolio, whereas 
path 3 probably seems to be more suited for scenarios 
that need a stronger technology push, such as the high 
RES or high energy efficiency cases. 
Different trade-offs arise regarding the choice of 
policies and instruments. Policy path 2 would allow 
for cost-efficient abatement given a perfect market 
setting but might be difficult to implement. Policy 
path 3 might be well suited to enhance green growth 
and can provide remedies to EU financial crises and 
institutional frictions, but suffers from weak carbon 
price signals and diluted technology targets. Besides 
the difficulty of evaluating impacts along one single 
criterion – various aspects and complexities have to 
be considered – alternative criteria can be weighted 
differently by different policy makers. Hence, any real 
world policy will likely involve a mix of elements of 
each of the above polar cases. 
4. EU technology push in an 
uncertain policy context 
Best practice for technology push will depend on the 
overall energy policy context. This context is uncertain, 
with uncertainty originating from two sources: First, 
as already discussed, there are many possible future 
policy paths and the fact that no policy path is clearly 
superior illustrates that the EU policy might change 
over the course of achieving decarbonization by 2050. 
Second, and not discussed so far, uncertainties can 
arise from changes in key objectives of EU energy 
policy. In this regard, section 4.1 is dedicated to the 
future policy context resulting from the unknown 
Box 2: Can the EU intervene on national energy mixes?
According to Art. 194 (2) of the Treaty of the Functioning 
of the EU, being part of the Energy Title, EU-level policy 
measures deemed necessary to achieve energy policy ob-
jectives such as the establishment of an internal market 
or supply security shall “not affect a Member State’s right 
to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy re-
sources, its choice between different energy sources and 
the general structure of its energy supply”.
At the same time, Art. 192 (2)(c), being part of the Environ-
ment Title, establishes that environmental policy measures 
“significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between 
different energy sources and the general structure of its 
energy supply” can be adopted. In this case, however, una-
nimity of the Council – which actually allows every Mem-
ber State to veto such decisions – and a consultation of the 
Parliament are required. 
A centrally coordinated policy measure such as harmo-
nized national targets for energy efficiency improvements 
or sectoral targets as introduced in policy option 3 would 
obviously affect Member States’ choices of energy sources 
and structure of energy supply. Therefore, it only could be 
adopted under the environmental legal basis (referring 
to Art. 192) but would not be justified under the energy 
market provisions (as specified in Art. 194).
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development of carbon pricing. Section 4.2 elaborates 
on possible future developments that are not yet 
recognized in the EU Energy Roadmap. Section 4.3 
then concludes on a robust push strategy and also 
presents additional “no-regret measures” that are 
relevant for any future EU energy technology policy.
4.1 Uncertain carbon prices
The policy context for a renewed post-2020 SET 
Plan and corresponding technology push is defined 
by market pull regimes, and here foremost by the EU 
ETS. Today, it can be heavily doubted that based on 
the current scheme and the currently determined 
emission cap, carbon prices in the magnitude of 
those reported in different EU Energy Roadmap 
scenarios and those needed in policy path 2 can be 
implemented.11 Though, design improvements have 
the potential to make the EU ETS a stronger policy 
instrument. The future ETS design should aim at 
including the highest possible base under the scheme 
and broaden the impact of the common carbon price, 
while also aligning non-ETS carbon prices. The 
carbon price signal could also be stabilized through 
advanced banking and borrowing means which help 
to moderate price fluctuations (Ellerman/Joskow, 
2008). 
11  Carbon prices in the underlying simulation exer-
cises are determined such that 2050 targets are reached, as-
suming equal prices/values for ETS and non-ETS sectors. 
These prices range between 234 and 310 EUR/t. 
Table 2: Summary of the evaluation of policy paths
Criterion Evaluation 
Climate-effectiveness We assume that the decarbonization objective can be reached under all policies. 
Green growth Path 3 is the most robust option with sectoral targets providing stable investment sig-
nals. The ability to account for different national technology push programs and to adjust 
the burden of decarbonization among Member States is only given in this policy path.
In contrast, path 1 has a lower ability to enhance green growth and path 2 has growth po-
tentials only in the longer-run, due to the high carbon price, that, however, also attracts 
non-EU made abatement products.
Robustness to EU finan-
cial crises and institu-
tional difficulties
Path 3 is the most robust option with sectoral targets providing stable investment 
signals on the one hand, and the ability to account for different national technology push 
programs and adjust the burden of decarbonization among Member States in times of 
crisis on the other.
In contrast, path 1 does not present adequate remedies, yet. Path 2 is not robust to 
financial crises or institutional frictions, too, due to the lack of the ability to account for 
Member State heterogeneity.
Cost-efficiency Path 2 is the most cost-efficient solution. Abatement costs across all sectors and abate-
ment channels are minimized when implementing one common emission price. 
In contrast, paths 1 and 3 suffer from weak carbon price signals and diluted technology 
targets.
Implementability Path 1 is most easy to implement, as implementation efforts are low and subsidiarity 
compatibility is given.
In contrast, path 2 is not fully feasible as the implementation of a scheme with one 
unique and high enough carbon price covering all GHG emissions would pose sever 
political difficulties. For path 3, implementation barriers mainly relate to achieving an 
agreement on sectoral targets and the related burden sharing among Member States. 
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Given the current absence of a strong enough car-
bon price, together with the necessity to stimulate 
the innovation machine now, the need for a renewed 
SET Plan with a higher signaling effect in terms of 
what technologies to push becomes apparent. Com-
ing back to the discussion on the policy paths, with a 
highly volatile emission price, and a potentially asym-
metric impact on different income classes and differ-
ent income countries, the benefits of an ETS dimin-
ish, even though from a theoretical cost-efficiency 
point of view, a cap-and-trade carbon pricing scheme 
dominates policy alternatives such as technology tar-
gets. When re-thinking where to depart from current 
2020 policies, it becomes clear that high carbon prices 
are promising for efficient decarbonization, but likely 
will not be entirely feasible for the foreseeable future. 
In such a policy context, the SET Plan and corre-
sponding technology push gain in importance.
4.2 Departures from the EU Energy 
Roadmap
It what has been discussed so far, we assumed that 
the 2050 decarbonization target is the central 
objective and that any EU energy technology policy 
aims at achieving the reduction of GHG emissions 
by 80-95%. We further assumed that even though 
there is uncertainty regarding the exact technology 
paths and system architecture, the possible menu of 
technologies is essentially known (including low-
carbon generation, the decarbonization of fossil fuels 
and demand-side measures), and as the different 
existing roadmaps indicate, this decarbonization is 
technically feasible. 
In what follows, we soften these assumptions and 
add further uncertainties to the picture. On the one 
hand, technological revolutions could substantially 
alter the set of available technologies contributing 
to decarbonization, what would have an impact on 
carbon prices and incentives to invest in innovation 
and deployment of other low-carbon technologies. 
On the other hand, shifts in paradigms to alternative 
policy objectives could outrank decarbonization. 
Hence, there are not only substantial uncertainties 
regarding viable decarbonization technologies within 
the context of the EU Energy Roadmap, but there are 
also possible futures that are not yet recognized in 
2050 roadmaps. 
4.2.1 Technological revolution
The EU Energy Roadmap scenarios build on a menu 
of essentially known technologies.12 However, 2050 is 
38 years from now. Thinking 40 years ago, there had 
not been the oil crises yet, European energy markets 
had national structures and electricity generation 
from RES was close to zero. In 2050, the energy system 
probably will be extremely different than it is today 
and the optimal portfolio of decarbonization technol-
ogies has a very long time horizon, not only looking 
ahead to the 2050 target, but technological lock-ins 
will persist even beyond. It is not only this very long-
term nature of the problem; also recent developments 
such as the Fukushima accident influenced possible 
future scenarios. For instance, a ‘2050 bridge role’ was 
still given to nuclear in the first version of the Ger-
man energy strategy in late 2010, whereas the country 
announced a nuclear phase out until 2022 one year 
later. Another example is the increasing interest in US 
unconventional gas resources. Whereas the IEA in its 
12  The SET Plan distinguishes among different de-
grees of maturity with Group 1 being close to market com-
petitiveness with an expected mass market deployment in 
the short- to medium-term; Group 2 comprising emerging 
technologies expected to become cost competitive between 
2020 and 2035; and Group 3 consisting of new technolo-
gies that are still immature today and expected to become 
competitive only after 2035.
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World Energy Outlook 2007 (when the 20-20-20 strat-
egy was adopted by the European Council) predicted 
a moderate growth for US gas production and did not 
mention shale gas at all, the World Energy Outlook 
2011 is talking about a possible “golden age of gas”. 
One important aspect is that any energy technology 
policy should allow for the creation of options and 
technological breakthroughs. Innovation activities 
here typically involve basic research, novel ideas with-
out the possibility to conduct cost-benefit analyses 
yet, or even fields of research that have not previously 
been seen as relevant to energy. Electro-fuels are a 
possible example: several research groups in the US 
work, in cooperation with the Department of Energy, 
on engineering an organism that converts electricity 
and CO2 into liquid fuels. The success of such a 3rd 
generation biofuel technology could revolutionize the 
transport sector. Another example is nuclear fusion 
which might become a source of reliable, low-carbon 
electricity generation not producing long-lived radio-
active waste products. Such very basic R&D requires 
special support. The highly risky nature of the projects 
and long time horizon until any (if any) benefits can 
be reaped make public co-funding essential. However, 
as discussed below, any institutional or political lock-
in of funding should be avoided to allow for an effi-
cient use of limited public funds.  
Another important aspect involves possible shocks 
that might eliminate technology options (e.g. Fuku-
shima accident) or add new means of decarboniza-
tion. One such latter situation could be a (more glob-
al) shale gas revolution that may severely shake up 
our today’s EU energy strategy: The production of 
shale gas, an unconventional gas resource, rose from 
less than 1% of domestic gas production in the US in 
2000 to over 20% in 2010. EIA forecasts expect a con-
tinuous rise up to more than 45% by 2035 (Stevens, 
2012). This recent development transformed the gas 
market into a buyers’ market with Henry Hub spot 
prices falling from ~8-10$/MBTU to current levels 
quite below 4 $/MBTU. Optimistic voices see a huge 
potential for shale gas worldwide providing abundant 
supplies of cheap gas.13 
Assuming that the US will become a large-scale ex-
porter of cheap gas and that it is possible to replicate 
the American experience in other parts of the world, 
what are implications for investments in decarboni-
zation and the EU energy technology policy? The 
availability of cheap gas on the market would allow 
for a certain degree of decarbonization at low cost (or 
even net benefits) via e.g. substituting coal by gas in 
the power sector, or oil by gas in transportation. If 
such business cases evolve, one could imagine that 
the EU, for instance, could see a phase-out of Polish 
coal and German lignite with the help of Polish shale 
gas. Hence, the ‘rational’ price of carbon might well 
fall extremely low under the push of shale gas as a 
‘market-based’ decarbonization technology. 
Nevertheless, natural gas is still a fossil fuel emit-
ting CO2 during combustion processes and the 2050 
decarbonization objective cannot be reached with 
shifting to gas alone. Shale gas may not only substi-
13  Indeed, there appear to be very large quantities 
of technically recoverable resources. China, for instance, is 
pushing strongly the development of its potential. Howev-
er, uncertainty about both volumes and costs persists. US 
companies currently produce from very large and shallow 
plays, whereas resources in other areas tend to be smaller 
and located in greater depths, increasing exploration and 
production costs. There is also a general tendency to cor-
rect estimates on available volumes downward: in early 
2012, Poland reduced its potential by 85% – from 5300bcm 
to below 800bcm. Furthermore, shale gas is produced 
based on horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing 
which involves the injection of chemicals. Severe environ-
mental concerns have created strong local oppositions, and 
France or Bulgaria have already banned shale gas opera-
tions. Such other negative externalities should be part of 
any cost-benefit analysis.
24
Final Report – January 2013
http://think.eui.eu
tute for dirty coal but also for expensive RES, and the 
lack of a carbon price signal will inhibit investments 
into the development and deployment of alternative 
low-carbon technologies. Hence, some explicit push 
for other decarbonization technologies (zero-carbon 
generation, or CCS) will be crucial if the 2050 objec-
tive shall be achieved.
In summary, 2050 is a very long-term horizon and 
technological revolutions can have important, unpre-
dictable impacts on the available set of and relative 
cost of decarbonization technologies. Also the role 
for electricity in decarbonization might be different 
than expected. Current thinking assumes that the 
decarbonization of this sector will be key and that 
electricity will play an increasing role in primary en-
ergy consumption. But this might change with e.g. 
a certain level of decarbonization in the transporta-
tion sector being achieved by shifting to gas-fuelled 
cars instead of electrification. This shows that there 
are some risks with focusing only on today’s SET Plan 
technologies if there might be futures that are not at 
all recognized in the current Roadmap. 
4.2.2  Paradigm shifts in EU energy policy
In 2009, the European Council agreed on the 
economy-wide GHG abatement objective of 80-
95% below 1990 levels by 2050. Consequently, 
decarbonization has become one central theme on 
the political agenda. But energy policy builds on 
three fundamental pillars: sustainability, as well as 
competitiveness and supply security. We assumed so 
far that Europe aims at achieving this environmental 
target in any case. Assuming now that alternative 
policy objectives could outrank decarbonization, 
would this lead us to a different optimal technology 
portfolio?
First, competitiveness could rank particularly high. 
Among the different policy objectives, there are both 
positive and negative interactions. One the one hand, 
there is a broad consensus that open and competitive 
markets and adequate infrastructure investments are 
conducive to supply security and decarbonization 
(see e.g. Glachant et al., 2010). On the other hand, 
however, any unilateral climate policy (be it national 
or EU-wide) imposing substantial asymmetric cost 
on the regulated agents bears the risks of being 
detrimental for economic growth and ineffective in 
reducing GHG emissions: such policies increase the 
industry’s cost at least in the short-run, which raises 
concerns from an economic point of view (loss in 
competitiveness), but also from an environmental 
perspective (carbon leakage). 
There is considerable debate about the extent of car-
bon leakage and policy measures mitigating this phe-
nomenon (e.g. Clò, 2010; Caron, 2012; Antimiani et 
al., 2012). One possible solution involves the free al-
location of emission allowances to ETS sectors that 
would be subject to the risk of carbon leakage.14 Al-
ternatively, several forms of border adjustments (e.g. 
import tariffs) could be applied if it can be ensured 
that such instruments are consistent with WTO rules 
and are not abused for protectionist reasons.15 Nev-
ertheless, there are also considerations about positive 
interactions between decarbonization and economic 
growth. Fankhauser et al. (2008) argue that “growth 
theory has long identified technical change and in-
novation as major source of economic growth” (p. 
14  Within the EU ETS, a progressive transition from 
grandfathering to auctioning is foreseen for energy-inten-
sive manufacturing installations (80% free allocation in 
2013, decreasing annually to 30% in 2020 and full auction-
ing in 2027).
15  See also Ahner (2009) for an in-depth discussion 
of the conformity of anticipated trade measures in EU cli-
mate change legislation with the international obligations 
of the Community under the WTO.
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426) and that long-term dynamic innovation effects 
induced by climate policies will bring about a net job 
creation. However, a shift in the European policy fo-
cus towards prioritizing competitiveness would cer-
tainly not improve conditions for successful imple-
mentation of decarbonization policies.
Second, supply security might receive higher prior-
ity on the political agenda. At first sight, there seems 
to be a certain conflict with the achievement of envi-
ronmental objectives, in particular CO2 mitigation, 
since these restrictions may limit options of energy 
supply. But climate policies can induce a broader 
use of low-carbon technologies, and thus also have a 
positive impact on diversification. Studying the UK 
electricity system, Grubb et al. (2006) find that the in-
troduction of an emission target of 60% will lead to a 
substantial increase in diversity of sources of genera-
tion (mainly driven by a declining dominance of gas 
in the fuel mix), whereas, in contrast, in the absence 
of any emission target, diversity decreases. Similar re-
sults can be expected for coal-based systems where 
the transition towards gas-fired generation to reduce 
emissions would increase diversity, too.
Diversity of generation and supply sources, however, 
is not necessarily a requirement for the national level 
in a European market. The Nordic countries, with 
Denmark relying strongly on wind energy and Nor-
way on hydro power, are a good example. In 2014, Sk-
agerrak 4, the fourth interconnector, jointly built by 
Statnett and Energinet.dk, will become operational. 
Interconnection capacities and a functioning com-
mon market ensure security of supply and facilitate 
RES production from the locally available resources. 
What are the implications of such shifts in paradigm? 
Would it require different strategies for an EU ener-
gy technology policy? Considerations regarding the 
competitiveness of European industry would prob-
ably weaken the EU ETS with exemptions from the 
scheme or the free allocation of emission allowances 
for certain sectors, or even an upward correction of 
the emission cap. Hence, to achieve the transition to 
a low-carbon economy, a well-designed energy tech-
nology policy will gain in importance. Similarly, from 
a supply security perspective, a balanced portfolio en-
suring a well-diversified supply mix calls for stronger 
(also directed) push policies. Market integration is a 
fundamental precondition for allowing for decarbon-
ization while ensuring secure supplies. Furthermore, 
supporting consumption-oriented measures – name-
ly improvements in energy efficiency and reductions 
in consumption – will be a strategic move in any case. 
They will not only contribute to decarbonization, but 
also decrease the cost of market players, and thus in-
crease their competitiveness, and reduce risks related 
to supply security. 
4.3 Recommendations for the future 
EU energy technology policy
Several implications for the future EU energy 
technology policy arise. While some directly concern 
the specifications of the SET Plan and the magnitude 
and direction of its accompanying technology push, 
others are of general nature and offer no-regret options.
4.3.1 A renewed SET Plan and its correspond-
ing technology push
A renewed post-2020 SET Plan should allow for all 
possible future policy paths and not exclude the pos-
sibility to act within a certain future context. It should 
be more focused than the current SET Plan and pro-
vide the basis for planning and prioritization among 
decarbonization technologies. Similar to the current 
model, stakeholders from individual sectors could 
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work together within Industrial Initiatives to identify 
technological progress and future research needs. In 
a second step, priority technologies – i.e. those (a) be-
ing key to achieve 2050, and/or (b) helping to support 
green growth within the Union – should be identi-
fied based on a comprehensive approach across sec-
tors.16 Selected technology targets and EU funding of 
innovation should then be in line with the SET Plan 
prioritization. Key performance indicators, similar to 
those already specified in today’s sectoral Technol-
ogy Roadmaps, shall be used as a tool for monitor-
ing and reviewing the progress of technology devel-
opment, demonstration and deployment and, hence, 
become an essential element contributing to funding 
decisions. 
There are several reasons that justify some directed 
technology push, instead of building fully on tech-
nology-neutral support to innovation. First, certain 
low-carbon technologies are key to achieve the transi-
tion to a low-carbon economy and there are reasonable 
concerns that without such support they will not be 
developed and deployed at the necessary scale and/
or on time. This could for instance be the case for 
CCS. All scenarios of the EU Energy Roadmap con-
tain a substantial part of electricity generation using 
this technology (between 10% in the ‘high RES’ and 
33% in the ‘Reference’ case in 2050, see also Appendix 
1) with CCS being viable from 2030 on. Other road-
maps present very similar numbers and assume com-
mercial-scale deployment already for 2020 or 2025. 
Hence, if the timely deployment of CCS is a necessary 
precondition to achieve climate objectives, further 
support to innovation and especially demonstration 
16  The current “business as usual” SET Plan does 
not include such a base for target setting across technology 
sectors in favor or against certain technologies. Hence, es-
pecially if carbon prices remain at relatively low levels, the 
current SET Plan is not able to deliver the basis for the then 
required strong target setting and corresponding technol-
ogy push. 
projects is justified. However, as discussed elsewhere 
in-depth (e.g. Hirschhausen et al., 2010), CCS can 
only thrive, if at the same time financial, political and 
regulatory risks are reduced.17 
Second, European technology push can have its justi-
fication as a means to respond to fierce global competi-
tion in green-tech markets and to help to keep wealth 
within the Union. Whereas the burden to finance 
market pull measures always is with consumers and 
tax payers but benefits can be reaped by both domes-
tic innovators and producers, but also market en-
trants from outside the EU, directed technology push 
can be designed such that it favors domestic players. 
Explicitly targeting specific technologies also allows 
policy makers to accelerate technology development 
and support industrial leadership. This strategy is 
promising especially for high-tech segments or parts 
of the value chain that cannot be outsourced to low-
cost competitors. It has to be noted, that strategic in-
dustry- and trade policy measures might be possible 
‘regret measures’ (see Box 2).
Despite these advantages for a coordinated and 
centralized European technology push, the overall 
policy design should still rely to a large extent on 
bottom-up participation. Especially technology 
projects with ‘normal risk and return profiles’ are well 
suited to be supported by individual Member States, 
leaving high-risk support for the EU. While a bottom-
up approach is certainly needed for national action 
plans and national funding, also the push coming 
17  Similar arguments also hold for other low-car-
bon technologies, such as certain RES or forms of electric-
ity storage. Stronger push policies here would become even 
more relevant if the large-scale deployment of CCS turns 
out to be infeasible and/or if more Member states decide 
a nuclear phase-out. Besides, also for different energy effi-
ciency measures many studies show that there is a substan-
tial economic potential of cost-efficient abatement, but that 
(especially non-economic) barriers hinder the realization 
of the full potential.
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from the European level will be bargained beforehand. 
Political considerations, such as who are beneficiaries 
of support, will aggravate the planning and priority 
setting for technologies when constructing the SET 
Plan and the agreements on where funding is derived 
from. 
These barriers become even larger since Member 
States are inhomogenous in their technology base 
and ability to finance. As discussed above, there are 
countries that benefit from relatively low financing 
cost and a high consumer willingness to pay for 
energy policy, whereas others suffer from rather 
limited private and public willingness and ability 
to pay for low-carbon innovation. In addition, low-
carbon technology bases range from strong low-
carbon industry positions for e.g. wind energy in 
Germany or Denmark, or nuclear in France, to 
countries that do not have any of those or similar 
technology advantages yet. These differences hamper 
agreements on a unified approach for technology 
Box 3: ‘Regret measure’ industry and trade policy?
A strong technology policy will intersect with industry- and 
trade policy. Industry policy can either rely on competitive 
forces to enable (green) growth, or might compromise on 
competition within the EU in favor of EU champions that 
compete globally, as for instance done in the EU air trans-
port sector with AIRBUS. This long lasting debate just be-
came topical once more with the recent EU Communica-
tion on industrial policy (EC, 2012c). 
Trade policy measures may either explicitly support home 
technologies on the world market (via subsidies), or protect 
them from foreign competition on the home market (via 
import quotas or tariffs). If the EU was the first mover, the 
rationale is to shift profits from foreign to domestic firms. 
Early literature on strategic trade policy (Spencer/Brander, 
1983; Krugman, 1987) finds that, if an industry is charac-
terized by increasing returns to scale, subsidizing home 
firms that then can commit to an increased future output, 
threatens the foreign firm. The foreign firm will decrease its 
output to not lower market prices. Subsidies given to the 
home firm are outweighed by the profits shifted from the 
foreign to the home firm. Whenever the EU would have to 
react to such measures undertaken by other countries, the 
rationale is to sanction the first mover. 
The global market for clean technology is huge in volume. 
According to Roland Berger and WWF (2012), in 2011, the 
market volume grew by 10% to about EUR 198bn. Further-
more, markets are relatively new and often not perfectly 
competitive. Hence, it is tempting for governments to en-
gage in trade policy to push domestic firms. Current trade 
disputes related to clean technologies, however, illustrate 
the complexity of trade policy. Most prominently, China 
is heavily supporting its solar PV industry, leading to anti-
dumping counter measures by the US. The US sets anti-
dumping duties between 18 and 250% on imported solar 
PV cells coming from China. Likewise, but on a smaller scale, 
Argentina is currently filing a case at the WTO, arguing that 
Spain was banning imports of biodiesel from Argentina by 
obliging consumers to buy biodiesel produced in Spain to 
fulfill EU targets on renewable energy.
Such policy measures also bear considerable risk. Besides 
provoking counter measures as in the China-US solar dis-
pute, subsidizing home technologies on the world market 
might lead to falling prices and vanishing industry profits. 
Within the above example, China’s aggressive policy led to 
a drastic fall of the world price of solar panels and hence 
the effectiveness of this policy in shifting profits can be 
doubted. China’s manufacturing capacity grew so much 
that an enormous oversupply was created. Falling prices re-
sulted in enormous difficulties for manufacturers and state-
owned banks, which invested in these manufacturers with 
about $ 18bn of low-interest loans.
Therefore, the strong reliance on competitive forces as 
outlined in several Directives should be maintained. Major 
rationales for introducing industry- and trade policy instru-
ments should relate to environmental or innovation exter-
nalities. All interventions going beyond this will effectively 
result in industry and trade policies that imply strong mar-
ket interventions which are not justified on the grounds of 
market failures. If such measures are opted for, they can be 
pursued under all policy paths, but best in path 3 with a 
technology push that is stronger than initial market failures 
imply, and thereby can result in a first mover advantage on 
the world market.
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support.18 Therefore, designing an energy technology 
policy top-down is difficult to sustain, which 
points out the need for decentralized solutions co-
existing to European funding and support schemes. 
Decentralized solutions further include possibilities 
to adapt burden sharing to national conditions and 
needs.
4.3.2 Technology-specific recommendations
Without detailed cost- and technology data at hand, 
disaggregated technology-specific recommendations 
as to what technologies and research activities to 
push are not possible. However, from our analysis we 
can draw several conclusions that will generally hold. 
Technology support should predominantly be given 
to consumption-oriented and enabling technologies 
as well as to basic research that still allows for future 
technology breakthroughs. While supporting energy 
efficiency enhancing technologies can show effects 
already in the very short-term and up to 2050 and 
beyond, funding a wide range of basic R&D leaves the 
possibility for entirely unforeseen green technology 
paths in the longer-term. Nevertheless, respective 
funding commitments should be given as early as 
possible.
As discussed in previous sections, a prioritization 
of low-carbon production technologies by policy 
makers entails high risks of picking wrong 
winners, especially so because future energy 
market developments like the evolution of shale 
18  Already in the current policy framework, na-
tional frictions become apparent, for example with nucle-
ar power, where much money is spent (see Appendix 2). 
Many countries where the public and the political process 
speak against nuclear power will very likely also not benefit 
from any support to nuclear innovation. Germany, for in-
stance, recently debated cutting its spendings for the ITER 
project. 
gas production and fossil fuel prices may entirely 
change the benefits and market value of different 
production technologies. In addition, the value 
chains of such production technologies are complex 
and involve many steps – inside and outside the 
EU. Any European market pull will not only benefit 
domestic players, but also incentivize investments 
in e.g. component manufacturing and innovations 
outside the Union. 
The situation is different for certain consumption-
oriented technologies, comprising mainly energy 
conservation and efficiency enhancing measures. 
Several reasons argue for pushing such technologies. 
As concluded above, there is a consensus that the 
long-term EU climate objectives cannot be reached 
without substantial improvements in energy 
efficiency. Furthermore, different studies show that 
many investments in efficiency enhancing measures, 
like in the building sector, can amortize very quickly. 
Moreover, due to their inherent nature of being less 
manufacturing-oriented but rather to a large extent 
relying on installing new appliances, incentivizing 
smart behavior, improving city smartness, etc., the 
implementation of energy conservation measures 
typically is quite labor-intensive, and, therefore, entails 
a larger positive effect on job creation. In addition, 
there is only limited labor mobility, implying that 
new jobs are created within the EU. Both push and 
pull policies targeting such consumption-oriented 
technologies will, therefore, have a higher effect on 
domestic job creation than policies targeting certain 
production-oriented technologies. Besides, pushing 
consumption-oriented technologies generally does 
not lead to large biases in energy markets, as is the 
case for production technologies where support 
for low-carbon generation will inevitably crowd 
out remaining competing (and also incumbent) 
technologies and, hence, can bias market efficiency 
in often unanticipated ways.
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Hence, pushing consumption-oriented technologies 
dominates pushing production-oriented 
technologies in terms of both feasibility and 
robustness. First, the above arguments indicate 
that such push is politically feasible: Opposing to a 
push for production technologies, that often would 
benefit certain Member States in which the major 
suppliers are located, energy efficiency enhancing 
measures benefit all EU industries, those offering 
energy efficiency products and all industries 
applying it. Hence, this push strategy is independent 
of geographic location and creates jobs throughout 
all Member States. Second, such push is robust 
with respect to future energy market developments: 
Consuming less is a no-regret policy. The EU might 
well look after its own ‘energy technology and 
security’ revolution in consuming significantly less 
energy. Energy efficiency is an enormous field of 
energy extraction open to us Europeans if we were 
smart and bold enough to tap into.
For similar reasons, pushing enabling technologies 
(such as grids, advanced metering or market 
facilitation via ICT equipment) is a valuable strategy. 
As for the technology group discussed above, 
investments typically are quite domestically labor-
intensive. However, for grid infrastructures – as for 
enabling technologies in general – the appropriate 
magnitude of investment will depend on the amount 
and type of renewable energy that enters the power 
system. The optimal system architecture also will 
depend on whether we move towards ‘European-
wide energy superhighways’ with massive solar 
energy being imported from North Africa and huge 
amounts of offshore wind energy being produced in 
the North Sea, or whether we move instead towards 
a system of rising local energy autonomy, featured 
also by widespread demand side management. 
As for funding basic R&D and the creation of options 
for technology breakthroughs, the above arguments 
in favor of consumption-oriented and enabling 
technologies however vanish. Energy efficiency 
enhancing technologies should be prioritized over 
production technologies that are close to the market. 
In contrast, for technologies early in the innovation 
chain, be it consumption- or production-oriented, 
the argument that one or another technology might 
be more feasible to being pushed and more likely 
to create green growth stimuli does not apply, since 
relevant industries do not yet exist. Successful 
deployment can only be expected at a certain (in 
many cases low) probability and in the longer-term 
well beyond 2030, or even after 2050. Nevertheless, 
support is required today. Technology policy here 
intersects with science and innovation policy. 
Whereas Framework Programmes, which were 
initially intended to support R&D, are now hosting 
an increasing amount of demonstration projects, the 
European Research Council, for instance, aims at 
promoting “bottom-up frontier research”.  
Because the stage of innovation involves basic 
research and very early R&D, i.e. projects that 
entail a low chance of success but a sufficiently 
high pay-off if successful, the argument for a broad 
technology funding becomes important. Over time 
and as the probability of success increases, funds 
should become more concentrated. Moreover, as has 
been shown in a former THINK report (Olmos et 
al., 2011), in choosing between projects where the 
expected benefits are the same, it seems preferable 
to bias funds towards riskier projects with the same 
expected return. 
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4.3.3 Additional “no-regret measures” for any 
policy
#1 – Create options for technology breakthroughs 
and bring successfully developed concepts to the 
market
Funding a certain amount of basic R&D is not only 
in line with addressing spillovers of innovation and 
with investing in technologies deployable after 2030, 
but also a no-regret strategy: Funding basic R&D is 
needed in all technology policy designs, and should 
be a main pillar in any future SET Plan. This part of 
funding will not lead to lock-in effects or stranded 
investments once a changed SET Plan mandates new 
technology priorities, as could happen for instance 
Box 4: Country cases
The case of the US: Volatile federal support policies
Under President Obama, plans to implement a Clean En-
ergy Standard, which would mandate that 80% of energy 
consumption come from clean sources by 2035, concretize. 
However, a proposed national cap-and-trade system for 
CO
2
 emissions failed in the Senate in 2010. It is rather indi-
vidual States that go ahead with ambitious climate policies, 
such as California, where a renewable portfolio standard 
(electric utilities have to have 33% of their retail sales de-
rived from RES by 2020) has been introduced. 
Comparing with the EU-27 and China, the US has the small-
est clean-tech sector relative to its GDP (Roland Berger/
WWF, 2012), and about half of all clean-tech sales come 
from biofuel production. This situation reflects the relative 
stability of public support for biofuels. Whereas for other 
low-carbon technologies federal policies are rather volatile, 
a scheme of federal tax credits created long-term incen-
tives for the production of biofuels. Recent initiatives also 
include plans to cut fossil fuel subsidies by $ 39bn, and the 
Department of Energy (DoE) has announced to co-finance 
offshore wind demonstration projects with a total of $ 
180mn over the coming six years. The Defense Department 
reaffirmed in April 2012 its commitment to source 25% of 
its electricity from RES by 2025. The 1603 program, as part 
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act a direct 
response to the crisis, provided co-funding to more than 
45,000 RES projects. A volume of $ 13bn public money trig-
gered $ 43.5bn of private investments.
Most existing programs, however, will expire soon and 
there is uncertainty about future energy technology poli-
cies. RES electricity production tax credits (Sec. 45) expire 
by the end of 2012; the Congress may (or may not) decide 
to extend or modify this instrument. Investment tax credits 
(Sec. 48) expire for geothermal and biomass (end of 2013) 
and solar (end of 2016). And ARPA‑E, a new agency within 
the DoE, established in 2007 to fund risky innovation tar-
geting ‘transformational’ energy technologies, does only 
focus on shorter-term funding. The economic stimulus 
package introduced in spring 2009 directed substantial re-
sources towards clean energy projects and the DoE’s budg-
et increased from about $ 5bn to $39bn. Though, federal 
funding and energy technology policies could not be “put 
on a more permanent footing” (Lester/Hart, 2012, pp. 43 f.), 
and the DoE budget has fallen back to its pre-crisis levels. 
Investors and innovators complain about unpredictability 
of public support policies. 
The case of Denmark: A success story, so far
Denmark is the world leader in specializing in clean tech-
nology relative to GDP (Roland Berger/WWF, 2012). Even 
though being a high-wage country, Denmark established 
comparative advantages. The country is especially success-
ful in the production of wind turbines with Vestas and also 
Siemens (parts of the German company are based in DK) as 
main players. This success grounds in both, strong technol-
ogy push and market pull. 
Technology push for wind energy already took off in the 
1980s and continued throughout the 1990s, leading to 
strong learning effects. This technology push had a strong 
focus on wind energy, and Denmark was able to outspend 
many other countries. Technology push was accompanied 
by strong and stable market creation policies. Already in 
the late 1990s, Denmark implemented a feed-in-tariff for 
wind, which was changed in 2002 into a feed-in-premium 
with a conditional subsidy of 1.6 ct/kWh (including com-
pensation for balancing costs of 0.3 ct/kWh), assured for 
a 20-year period (Ropenus/Jensen, 2009). In 2008 and to 
guarantee the achievement of 2020 goals, the subsidy was 
increased for onshore wind to 3.4 ct/kWh for the first 22,000 
full load hours. During following hours, energy is sold at the 
spot market. Besides, Denmark also invested in energy ef-
ficiency. Today, the Danish company Rockwool is the world 
market leader in insulation material. 
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due to changes in market fundamentals as discussed 
earlier. For the same reason, building a policy to 
a certain degree on the creation of options for new 
advanced technologies offers a policy exit strategy 
at low costs. As mentioned in Narayanamurti et al. 
(2010), it is, nevertheless, still important to commit 
to such funding in the long-run.
It is then equally important to bring concepts that have 
been successfully developed in the laboratory to the 
manufacturing phase and to commercial deployment. 
European support to (incremental) innovation can 
help to bridge the “valley of death” and to bring first 
prototypes of new technologies to the market. The 
Intelligent Energy Europe II program (2007-2013) 
already aims at supporting the overcoming of non-
technological barriers (including informational, 
behavioral, institutional and financial barriers) to 
innovation and implementation of “promotion and 
dissemination projects” (i.e. projects that bridge 
between upstream R&D and downstream market 
adoption). A successor of this program should have 
an even stronger focus on raising awareness and skills 
as well as on improving market conditions to create 
favorable investment conditions. 
#2 – Enable an attractive and stable business 
environment
A public consultation launched by CEER (CEER, 
2012) revealed that – compared to the type and 
level of support – the stability of support policies 
was considered the by far most important factor for 
investors, reflecting the need for investment certainty 
given the high up-front cost and long payback periods 
of many low-carbon projects. Thereby, stability must 
not be understood as ‘keeping things fixed and 
unchanged’, but instead it relates to predictability and 
transparency, namely to a clear formulation of policy 
goals and a reliable investment environment where 
policy paths are clearly communicated ex-ante. Box 
4 provides further insights regarding two exemplary 
cases: whereas in the US, federal funding and energy 
technology policies could not be “put on a more 
permanent footing” (Lester/Hart, 2012, pp. 43 f.), 
technology push in Denmark was accompanied by 
strong and stable market creation policies. 
Moreover, stakeholders complain about 
administrative hurdles. Complex and lengthy 
permit granting procedures are seen as a major 
barrier to invest (EC, 2012b) increasing project 
risk, which, particularly in countries with stressed 
capital markets, results in rising cost of capital. 
Recent policy initiatives are promising. Compared 
to former Framework Programmes, Horizon 2020 
aims to improve administrative procedures with 
a simpler program architecture, a single access 
point, less paperwork, etc., in order to reduce the 
administrative costs of participants and accelerate 
the processes of proposal and grant management. 
Especially small innovators, as SMEs, should benefit 
from this simplification. Also the implementation of 
an EU patenting system in 2014, as has recently been 
ratified by the European Parliament, will substantially 
decrease cost for innovators. 
Last but not least, an important role of EU institutions 
remains to ensure a functioning internal market 
and a level-playing field, as has been discussed in-
depth in several former THINK reports (Meeus et 
al., 2011b; Ruester et al., 2012 & 2012b). To set the 
right incentives for technology deployment and 
development, it is essential to increase transparency, 
facilitate market entry of new players, and to improve 
market price signals also in balancing and ancillary 
service markets. Political borders should not restrict 
trade. It is the market that should create its own pliable 
borders, acknowledging technical and economic 
aspects. Furthermore, regulated end consumer 
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prices should be abolished in order to provide 
correct price signals and enable the implementation 
of various consumption-oriented measures. 
 
#3 – Engage consumers and citizens
Another important aspect is the need to remove barriers 
to behavioral change and to the implementation of 
consumption-oriented decarbonization measures. 
Many studies show that there is a difference between 
energy efficiency improvements that could be 
achieved with net benefits and current observed 
levels (Jones/Glachant, 2010; IEA, 2012) and that a 
non-negligible part of available public funding is not 
yet used. 
Various barriers prevent action (see e.g. Estache/
Kaufmann, 2011). First, regulated energy prices in 
some Member States provide wrong price signals to 
end consumers. Second, decision processes involve 
many local, decentralized, small-scale projects, and 
actors often do not have appropriate skills and/or 
information, and tend to apply (too) high discount 
rates when evaluating respective investments. A lack 
of information prevents targeted actors from making 
the right decisions since the menu of options is not 
fully known and/or they are not able to evaluate 
options correctly. Information asymmetries lead to 
wrong incentives. If the potential investor is not the 
party that pays the energy bill, perfect information 
alone may not be sufficient for optimal investment. 
Third, a “not-in-my-term” attitude might make 
politicians think and act in the short-term. Ac-
tions and money spent need to demonstrate clear 
benefits and added value for their voters, while e.g. 
the transformation to a sustainable city might take 
decades (Meeus et al., 2011).
These barriers can be addressed by implementing 
regulatory measures such as minimum efficiency 
standards for appliances and buildings. Information 
policies including for instance the labeling of 
products or education programs reduce ignorance 
and information asymmetries and also can foster 
behavioral changes. Technical Assistance Facilities 
have been set up to support the documentation of 
project applications, such as feasi bility studies or the 
formulation of a business plan. Around EUR 200mn 
have already been devoted to ma jor (JASPERS, 
ELENA-EIB), medium (ELENA-KfW, ELENA-CEB, 
ELENA-EBRD) and minor (MLEI) energy efficiency 
enhancing projects. 
Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) can help to 
overcome constraints in paying possibly high 
upfront cost and can substantially reduce clients’ 
search and information efforts. Despite the clear 
advantages that ESCO business models can bring 
as intermediaries for energy efficiency enhancing 
investments, this concept is still not well developed 
in Europe. There are significant differences regarding 
the growth of the ESCO market among Member 
States and successful development typically can 
be associated with improved efforts and measures 
to enable market building (Marino et al., 2011). 
In Italy, for instance, the introduction of White 
Certificates notably pushed ESCO activities. 
 
#4 – Spend the available public money wisely
A financing gap of EUR 47-60bn between current 
expenditures and those deemed necessary to achieve 
specified technology targets until 2020 has been 
identified within the frame of the current SET Plan. 
In the 2050 context, these numbers will become even 
higher and the recent economic and financial crisis 
had a further negative impact on the availability of 
private and public funds. Experts agree that 2050 is 
technologically feasible, but that a key challenge will 
be the mobilization of the required capital.
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Subsidies in the form of grants and contracts are by far 
the preferred policy instruments to fund clean energy 
innovation of any type. However, this instrument 
should only be used as an instrument of last resort. 
Olmos et al. (2011) provide an in-depth analysis 
on how appropriate financing policy instruments 
ought to be chosen.19 The form of direct public 
support, considering also e.g. low-interest loans, 
loan guarantees, public equity and technology prizes, 
needs to be tailored to the features of each innovation 
project – depending on both the technology targeted 
and its level of maturity – and to the type of entity 
best placed to undertake the respective RD&D. 
Spending public money wisely also involves a smart 
design of financing instruments. Public funding 
should be output-driven whenever this is compatible 
with the engagement of private innovators, which 
involves making the release of funds and their amount 
conditional on the achievement of some minimum 
objectives, i.e. linking support to performance 
indicators. Moreover, the institutions set up to allocate 
funds should be lean and flexible enough to avoid 
institutional inertia and lock-in. New technologies 
need to be gradually integrated into the market and a 
level-playing field needs to be ensured in the longer-
19  Public loans are well suited to finance lower cost 
innovations with well quantifiable future market prospects 
carried out by larger companies. They become relevant if 
the liquidity of the capital market is low or in recessions 
when private credit markets’ appetite for risk is unduly de-
pressed. Publicly owned equity is suitable to finance risky, 
potentially highly profitable, innovation preferably un-
dertaken by small entities. Technology prizes can support 
early low-cost innovation. Tax credits and other benefits 
related to RD&D investments are best suited to support 
near-market, incremental innovation conducted by larger 
companies. Grants and contracts – on the one hand the 
most attractive form of support from the innovators’ per-
spective but on the other the most expensive instrument 
– should only be awarded to socially desirable clean energy 
innovation that would not be undertaken otherwise and 
where all other instruments would fail. 
run, which has to come with a clear and anticipated 
phase-out of technology subsidies.
Recent policy initiatives already are a first step 
towards smart financing support. The European 
Energy Efficiency Fund is a public-private partnership 
open to investments from governments, international 
financial institutions, donor agencies and other 
private investors. It offers different types of debt and 
equity instruments to projects dedicated to energy 
efficiency, small-scale RES and clean urban transport 
projects. The Risk Sharing Finance Facility has been 
jointly developed by the Commission and the EIB 
to co-finance higher-risk R&D involving complex 
products and technologies, or being subject to 
unproven markets and intangible assets. Support of 
up to EUR 300mn per project is primarily provided in 
the form of loans and loan guarantees and some equity 
financing coming from the European Investment 
Fund. The Horizon 2020 program will include output-
based funding such as technology prizes. Loan and 
equity financing are expected to play a greater role, 
too. For the future, it is therefore also important to 
facilitate the development of exit options for equity 
investors.
Besides, new funding sources should be considered. 
Existing fossil fuel subsidies need to be revised. A 
substantial amount of (national) public money is still 
spent to back the production or consumption of coal, 
natural gas and oil products. Germany for instance did 
directly support coal producers with about EUR 2bn 
in 2009. A similar sum was mobilized by the Italian 
government in 2011 to support the consumption 
of transport fuels, mainly via tax reliefs. Moreover, 
policy makers should consider the wider use of 
auction revenues from the EU ETS to fund innovation. 
In the third allocation period, there are no National 
Allocation Plans anymore; instead Directive 2009/29/
EC sets detailed guidelines for the auctioning of 
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allowances from 2013 on.20 A part of these revenues 
could be dedicated to a centralized EU fund. A 
substantial amount of money could be collected in this 
way. For the existing NER300 financing instrument, 
only 300mn emission allowances have been set aside 
in the New Entrants’ Reserve. Sold at the current CO2 
price of about EUR 7.50 per ton of CO2 this would 
yield revenues of about EUR 2.25bn. At price levels 
of about EUR 25 one would already talk about EUR 
7.5bn here.21
4.4 Main findings
Best practice for technology push will depend on the 
overall energy policy context. This context is uncertain, 
with uncertainty originating from two sources: First, 
the role of the SET Plan will depend on the context of 
carbon pricing. Second, there are also possible futures 
that are not yet recognized in 2050 roadmaps. On the 
one hand, shifts in paradigm of EU energy policy away 
from decarbonization and in favor of competitiveness 
might weaken carbon pricing mechanisms, calling 
for an even stronger technology support. Similarly, 
a shift in favor of supply security requires a stronger 
push for decarbonization technologies to achieve 
20  Full auctioning should be the rule from 2013 on-
wards for the electricity sector. For other ETS sectors than 
power production, a transitional system will be put in place 
resulting in 70% of allowances to be auctioned in 2020. 
21  Another possible option to raise additional EU 
funds that then can be used for coordinated support to in-
novation could be an EU tax dedicated to investments com-
bating climate change. However, similar to what happened 
during the 1990s, when a carbon tax was proposed at the 
EU level but failed due to huge opposition from different 
Member States, any agreement on an EU-wide tax would 
be accompanied by severe difficulties. The question then 
also would be on which competence title the EC could base 
the respective legislation, i.e. Directive or Regulation, to 
impose the implementation of such a tax on the Member 
States. The legal basis establishes the procedure to pursue 
the respective policy, and, thus, decides if the Council has 
to act by a qualified majority or unanimously.
balanced energy portfolios, as well as a strong push for 
enabling technologies such as networks to guarantee 
properly working energy systems. On the other hand, 
technological revolutions, such as a possible global 
shale gas revolution, could result in the ‘rational’ 
price of carbon falling extremely low. 
A renewed, post-2020 SET Plan should allow for all 
possible future policy paths. It should not exclude 
the possibility to act within a certain future context 
and, hence, should be more focused than the current 
SET Plan to provide the basis for planning and 
prioritization among decarbonization technologies. 
There are several reasons that justify some directed 
technology push, instead of building fully on 
technology-neutral support to innovation. Certain 
low-carbon technologies are key to achieving the 
transition to a low-carbon economy and there are 
reasonable concerns that without such support they 
will not be developed and deployed at the necessary 
scale and/or on time. Moreover, European technology 
push can have its justification as a means to respond 
to fierce global competition in green-tech markets 
and to help to keep wealth within the Union. 
A prioritization of low-carbon production 
technologies entails high risks of picking wrong 
winners. In contrast, pushing energy efficiency 
enhancing technologies dominates other push 
strategies in terms of both feasibility and robustness. 
Also pushing enabling technologies is a no-regret 
strategy. However, for grid infrastructures – as for 
enabling technologies in general – the appropriate 
magnitude of investment will depend on the amount 
and type of renewable energy that enters the power 
system. 
Finally, the creation of options has to be a main pillar 
in any future SET Plan. The funding of potential 
technology breakthroughs will not lead to lock-in 
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effects or stranded investments once a changed SET 
Plan mandates new technology priorities, but instead 
is disconnected from future policy paths. It is then 
equally important to bring to the manufacturing 
phase and to commercial deployment concepts that 
have been successfully developed in the laboratory. 
European support to (incremental) innovation can 
help to bridge the ‘valley of death’ and to bring to 
the market first prototypes of new technologies. 
Stimulating the ‘innovation machine’ today 
guarantees further incremental innovation in the 
future and a wider technology set to choose from in 
achieving the decarbonization objective.
5. Conclusions and recommenda-
tions
Challenges for policy makers are huge if the EU 
climate policy goal of reducing GHG emissions to 
80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050 shall be reached. 
In the light of these challenges this report develops 
and discusses possible paths for a renewed EU energy 
technology policy. There is no doubt that a new and 
stable energy technology policy design for the post-
2020 period is needed. It is, however, not clear how 
exactly it will address limitations of the current 2020 
framework while, at the same time, taking account 
of fierce global competition in markets for clean 
technologies. Moreover, as market actors are calling 
for a new technology policy framework now, the 
policy will likely be negotiated in times of financial 
crisis and also institutional frictions in the EU, of 
which no one can predict its duration.
Departing from a reference case, i.e. the continuation 
and extension of 2020 policies to the 2050 horizon, 
we identify two possible directions for a future EU 
energy technology policy. A first path building 
on a strong carbon price signal will mainly involve 
technology-neutral support to innovation. After 
having delivered its initial push, the SET Plan as an 
instrument to prioritize among technologies and 
projects ceases by 2020. It would rather function 
in a “light” version as a platform for open access 
information exchange and stakeholder coordination 
and cooperation. In contrast, for a  second policy 
path departing from a weak carbon price signal and 
technology targets, directed push will play a major 
role to enforce targets and action will predominantly 
come from decentralized, national initiatives. In this 
path, an advanced SET Plan would also provide the 
basis for the determination of an optimal portfolio of 
low-carbon technologies, as well as for the optimal 
allocation of public (especially European) funds.
No policy path is clearly superior to another. Our 
evaluation of these policies shows that whereas price 
signals are, in theory, the most cost-efficient way 
to achieve climate goals, in practice the signaling 
effect of carbon prices might not be strong enough. 
Policymakers face considerable difficulties to 
implement ‘high-enough’ prices and to include 
all GHG emissions into the scheme. Technology 
targets and directed push, on the other hand, have 
a relatively larger potential to enhance green growth 
and to give (even if biased in magnitude) strong 
signals to investors. Moreover, technology targets 
could account for different national technology push 
programs and adjust the burden of decarbonization 
among Member States. In times of economic crisis 
and institutional frictions, these burden sharing and 
cooperation mechanisms increase the robustness and 
implementability of technology support.
In a bigger perspective, two major concerns, 
adding further uncertainties, appear. First, it is 
not guaranteed that – given the triangle of energy 
policy goals with decarbonization, security of supply 
and competitiveness – long-run energy policy will 
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maintain its decarbonization focus. Shifts in paradigm 
of EU energy policy away from decarbonization and 
in favor of competitiveness might weaken carbon 
pricing mechanisms, calling for an even stronger 
technology support. Similarly, a shift in favor of supply 
security requires a stronger push for decarbonization 
technologies to achieve balanced energy portfolios, as 
well as a strong push for enabling technologies such 
as networks to guarantee properly working energy 
systems. Second, technological revolutions, such as a 
possible global shale gas revolution, could result in 
the ‘rational’ price of carbon falling extremely low. 
A renewed post-2020 SET Plan should allow for 
all possible future policy paths. The fact that there 
are many possible future policies and uncertainties 
not recognized in 2050 roadmaps illustrates that 
the EU policy might change over the course of 
achieving decarbonization by 2050. A renewed SET 
Plan should not exclude the possibility to act within 
a certain future context. It should be more focused 
than the current SET Plan and provide the basis for 
planning and prioritization among decarbonization 
technologies. In the first step and similar to the current 
model, stakeholders from individual sectors could 
work together within Industrial Initiatives to identify 
technological progress and future research needs. In 
a second step, priority technologies that (a) are key 
to achieve 2050, and/or (b) can help to support green 
growth within the Union should be identified based 
on a comprehensive approach across sectors. Such 
targets have to be determined by carefully analyzing 
growth potentials of European manufacturers and the 
degree of competition they face from foreign clean 
technology producers. Selected technology targets 
and EU funding of innovation should then be in line 
with the SET Plan prioritization. 
Pushing energy efficiency enhancing technologies 
dominates other push strategies in terms of both 
feasibility and robustness. Without detailed cost- and 
technological data at hand, disaggregated technology-
specific recommendations as to what technologies 
and research activities to push are not possible. 
However, from our analysis we can draw a conclusion 
that generally holds. A prioritization of low-carbon 
production technologies entails high risks of picking 
wrong winners. In contrast, pushing energy efficiency 
enhancing technologies, first, is politically feasible: 
Opposing to a push for production technologies 
that often would benefit certain Member States in 
which major suppliers are located, energy efficiency 
enhancing technologies benefit all industries 
independent of geographic location and create 
jobs throughout all Member States. Second, such 
push is robust with respect to future energy market 
developments: Consuming less is a no-regret policy 
and minimizes system interdependences of a directed 
push. 
The creation of options for technology 
breakthroughs has to be a main pillar in any 
future SET Plan. While strategies for technologies 
close to the market rely on shorter-run benefits 
like green growth stimuli up to 2020 or 2030, such 
push strategies have to be accompanied by long-run 
funding commitments for a wide range of immature 
technologies that might be successfully deployable 
after 2030 and towards 2050. Because the stage of 
innovation involves basic research and very early 
R&D, i.e. projects that entail a low chance of success 
but a sufficiently high pay-off if successful, the 
argument for a broad technology funding becomes 
important. Over time and as the probability of success 
increases, funds should become more concentrated. 
Such funding of potential technology breakthroughs 
will not lead to lock-in effects or stranded investments 
once a changed SET Plan mandates new technology 
priorities, but instead is disconnected from future 
policy paths.
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The future energy technology policy also has 
to present a reliable and credible framework to 
investors and innovators, and also to consumers, 
who ultimately pay for these policies. In this vein, 
we present several additional “no-regret measures” 
being valid for any future policy. Policies should 
create options for technology breakthroughs and 
bring successfully developed concepts to the market, 
enable an attractive and stable business environment, 
the limited public money needs to be spent wisely, 
new EU funding sources (such as the increased use of 
income generated through the auctioning of emission 
allowances) should be considered, and there is a need 
to remove barriers to behavioral change. 
In contrast, there might be some “regret measures” 
related to industry and trade policy. Current trade 
disputes related to clean technologies illustrate the 
complexity of such policies – there is a fine line 
between supporting technologies and subsidizing 
industries. Any industrial or trade policy favoring 
European players, therefore, must be debated and 
designed with care and rationales for introducing 
such measures should only relate to environmental or 
innovation externalities. 
Whatever way taken towards 2050, this analysis 
shows that a variety of policy fields and instruments 
can be employed to govern future energy technologies 
and decarbonization. In times of financial crises and 
institutional frictions, more aggressive and directed 
technology policy intervention can be justified. 
38
Final Report – January 2013
http://think.eui.eu
References
Acemoglu, D. (2010): Diversity and technological 
progress. MIT Working Paper, to appear in The 
Rate and Direction of Technological Progress by 
Joshua Lerner and Scott Stern (editors), National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
Aghion, P., R. Veugelers and C. Serre (2009): Cold 
Start for the green Innovation Machine. Bruegel 
Policy Brief 2009/12.
Aghion, P., D. Hemous and R. Veugelers (2009b): No 
green growth without innovation. Bruegel Policy 
Brief 2009/07.
Ahner, N. (2009): Final instance: World Trade 
Organization – Unilateral trade measures in EU 
climate change legislation. EUI Working Paper, 
RSCAS 2009/58.
Antimiani, A., V. Costantini, C. Martini, L. Salvatici 
and M.C. Tommasino (2012): Assessing 
alternative solutions to carbon leakage. Energy 
Economics, forthcoming.
Baumol, W.J. and W.E. Oates (1971): The use of 
standards and prices for protection of the 
environment. Swedish Journal of Economics, Vol. 
73, No. 1, pp. 42-54.
Bowen, A., S. Frankhauser, N. Stern and D. 
Zenghelis (2009): An outline of the case for 
a ‘green’ stimulus. Policy Brief, Grantham 
Research Institute on Climate Change and the 
Environment and Centre for Climate Change 
Economics and Policy, LSE.
Caron, J. (2012): Estimating carbon leakage and 
the efficiency of border adjustments in general 
equilibrium – Does sectoral aggregation matter? 
Energy Economics, forthcoming.
CEER (2012): Implications of non-harmonized 
renewable support schemes. CEER Conclusions 
Paper, C12-SDE-25-04b. 
Cohen L.R. and R.G. Noll (1991): The Technology 
Pork Barrel. The Brookings Institution.
Clò, S. (2010): Grandfathering, auctioning and 
carbon leakage: Assessing the inconsistencies of 
the new ETS Directive. Energy Policy, Vol. 38, pp. 
2420-30.
Delgado, J. (2007): Why Europe is not carbon 
competitive. Bruegel Policy Brief 2007/05.
EC (2009): Decision 406/2009/EC on the effort of 
Member States to reduce their GHG emissions to 
meet the Community’s GHG emission reduction 
commitments up to 2020. 
EC (2010): Energy 2020 – A strategy for competitive, 
sustainable and secure energy. COM(2010) 639/3.
EC (2011): A roadmap for moving to a competitive 
low-carbon economy in 2050. COM(2011) 112. 
EC (2011b): Renewable energy: Progressing towards 
the 2020 target. COM(2011) 31.
EC (2011c): European competitiveness report 2011. 
Commission staff working document SEC(2011) 
1188.
EC (2011d): Review of European and national 
financing of renewable energy in accordance with 
Article 23(7) of Directive 2009/28/EC. SEC(2011) 
131. 
http://think.eui.eu 39
A New EU Energy Technology Policy towards 2050: Which Way to Go?
EC (2012): A European strategy for Key Enabling 
Technologies – A bridge to growth and jobs. 
COM(2012)341.
EC (2012b): On the implementation of the European 
Energy Programme for Recovery. COM(2012) 
445.
EC (2012c): A stronger European industry for growth 
and economic recovery. COM(2012) 582.
EC (2012d): Renewable Energy: a major player in the 
European energy market. COM(2012) 271.
Ecofys, Fraunhofer ISI, EEG and LEI (2011): 
Renewable energy policy country profiles. 2011 
version. Report prepared within the Intelligent 
Energy Europe project RE-Shaping – Shaping 
an effective and efficient European renewable 
energy market.
Ellerman, A.D. and B.K. Buchner (2008): Over-
Allocation or Abatement? A Preliminary Analysis 
of the EU ETS Based on the 2005–06 Emissions. 
Environmental Resource Economics, Vol. 41, No. 
2, pp. 267-87.
Ellerman, A.D. and P.L. Joskow (2008): The European 
Union’s Emission Trading System in perspective. 
Report prepared for the Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change. 
Ellerman, A.D., F.J. Convery, and C. de Perthuis 
(2010): Pricing carbon: The European Union 
emission trading scheme. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.
Estache, A. and M. Kaufmann (2011): Theory and 
evidence on the economics of energy efficiency. 
Lessons for the Belgian building sector. Reflets et 
perspectives de la vie économique, 2011/3. ISSN 
0034-2971.
Eurelectric (2011): Power Choices – Pathways to 
carbon-neutral electricity in Europe by 2050. 
European Climate Foundation and McKinsey (2010): 
A Practical Guide to a Prosperous Low Carbon 
Europe. 
European Parliament (2010): Report on simplifying 
the implementation of the Research Framework 
Programmes. A7-0274/2010.
Fankhauser, S. F. Sehlleier and N. Stern (2008): 
Climate change, innovation and jobs. Climate 
Policy, Vol. 8, pp. 421-9.
Fouquet, D. (2013): Policy instruments for renewable 
energy – from a European perspective. Renewable 
Energy, Vol. 49, pp. 15-8.
Foxon, T.J. (2003): Inducing Innovation for a Low-
Carbon Future: Drivers, Barriers and Policies. 
Report for The Carbon Trust.
Gilder Cooke, S.v. (2012): Will austerity derail 
Europe’s clean-energy movement? Article 
published at http://www.time.com. 
Glachant, J.-M., R. Grant, M. Hafner and J. de Jong 
(2010): Toward a smart EU energy policy: 
Rational and 22 recommendations. EUI RSCAS 
Working Paper 2010/52.
Goulder, L.H. and W.H. Parry (2008): Instrument 
Choice in Environmental Policy. Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy, Vol. 2, pp. 
152-74.
40
Final Report – January 2013
http://think.eui.eu
Greenpeace (2010): Energy (R)evolution – Towards a 
fully renewable energy supply in the EU-27. 
Grubb, M. (2004): Technology innovation and 
climate change policy: An overview of issues and 
options. Keio Economic Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, 
pp. 103-32.
Grubb M., L. Butler and P. Twomey (2006): Diversity 
and security in UK electricity generation: The 
influence of low-carbon objectives. Energy Policy, 
Vol. 34, pp. 4050-62.
Grubb M. and D.M. Newbery (2007): Pricing 
carbon for electricity generation: National 
and international dimensions. In: Delivering 
a low carbon electricity system: technologies, 
economics and policy. Report within the 
SUPERGEN Project; pp. 364-412.
Hirschhausen, C.v., C. Haftendorn, J. Herold, F. Holz, 
A. Neumann and S. Rüster (2010): Europe’s Coal 
Supply Security: Obstacles to Carbon Capture, 
Transport and Storage. CEPS Policy Brief 223/
Nov. 2010.
Horbach, J. (2007): Determinants of environmental 
innovation: New evidence from German panel 
data sources. Research Policy, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 
163-73.
Hyytinen, A. and O. Toivanen (2005): Do financial 
constraints hold back innovation and growth? 
Evidence on the role of public policy. Research 
Policy, Vol. 34, pp. 1385-403.
International Energy Agency (2012): Energy 
Technology Perspectives 2012 – Pathways to a 
clean energy system. 
Jacobsson, S., A. Bergek, D. Finon, V. Lauber, C. 
Mitchell, D. Toke and A. Verbruggen (2009): EU 
renewable energy support policy: Faith or facts? 
Energy Policy, Vol. 37, pp. 2143-6.
Jaffe, A.B. (1996): The importance of spillovers in 
the policy mission of the Advanced Technology 
Program. Journal of Technology Transfer, Vol. 23, 
No. 2, pp. 11-19.
Johnstone, N. and I. Hascic (2010): Directing 
technological change while reducing the risk of 
(not) picking winners: The case of renewable 
energy. Working Paper. 
Jones, C. and J.-M. Glachant (2010): Why and how 
the EU can get a (near to) carbon-free energy 
system in 2050. MIT CEEPR Working Paper 10-
002.
Kempfert, C. and K. Schumacher (2005): Costs of 
inaction and costs of action in climate protection 
– assessment of costs of inaction or delayed 
action of climate protection and climate change. 
German Institute of Economic Research, Final 
report Project FKZ 90441362 for the Federal 
Ministry for the Environment. 
Kitzing, L., C. Mitchell and P.E. Morthorst (2012): 
Renewable energy policies in Europe: Converging 
or diverging? Energy Policy, forthcoming.
Krugman, P.R. (1987): Is free trade passé? Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 1, pp. 131-44.
Lester, R.K. and D.M Hart (2012): Unlocking energy 
innovation: How America can build a low-cost, 
low-carbon energy system. The MIT Press. 
Liljelund, L.E., J. Núnñez Ferrer, C. Egenhofer and 
http://think.eui.eu 41
A New EU Energy Technology Policy towards 2050: Which Way to Go?
M. Alessi (2011): The SET Plan – From concept 
to successful implementation. CEPS Task Force 
Report. 
Marino, A., P. Bertoldi, S. Rezessy, B. Boza-Kiss 
(2011): A snapshot of the European energy service 
market in 2010 and policy recommendations 
to foster a further market development. Energy 
Policy, Vol. 39, pp. 6190-98.
Martin, S. and J.T. Scott (2000): The Nature of 
Innovation Market Failure and the Design of 
Public Support for Private Innovation. Research 
Policy, Vol. 29, No. 4-5, pp. 437-447.
Martin, R., M. Muuls, and U. Wagner (2012): An 
evidence review of the EU ETS, focusing on 
effectiveness of the system in driving industrial 
abatement. Report prepared for the Department 
of Energy and Climate Change. 
Meeus, L., E. de Oliveira Fernandes, V. Leal, I. Azevedo, 
E. Delarue and J.-M. Glachant (2011): Smart 
cities initiative: How to foster a quick transition 
towards local sustainable energy systems. Final 
report of the EU FP7 Funded Research project 
THINK (Topic n° 2/12: http://think.eui.eu). 
ISBN:978-92-9084-068-8; doi:10.2870/34539.
Meeus, L., M. Hafner, I. Azevedo, C. Marcantonini 
and J.-M. Glachant (2011b): Transition towards 
a low-carbon energy system by 2050: What 
role for the EU?. Final report of the EU FP7 
Funded Research project THINK (Topic n° 3/12: 
http://think.eui.eu). ISBN:978-92-9084-070-1; 
doi:10.2870/35290.
Meeus, L., F. Lévêque, I., M. Saguan, and J.-M. 
Glachant (2012): Offshore grids: Towards a least 
regret EU policy. Final report of the EU FP7 
Funded Research project THINK (Topic n° 5/12: 
http://think.eui.eu). ISBN:978-92-9084-073-2; 
doi:10.2870/35425.
Meeus, L., Kaderjak, P., Azevedo, I., Kotek, P. and 
J.-M. Glachant (2012b): How to refurbish all 
buildings by 2050. Final report of the EU FP7 
Funded Research project THINK (Topic n° 7/12: 
http://think.eui.eu). ISBN:978-92-9084-084-8; 
doi:10.2870/4119.
Murphy, L.M. and P.L. Edwards (2003): Bridging 
the valley of death: Transitioning from public 
to private sector financing. National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory, Working Paper NREL/MP-
720-34036.
Narayanamurti, V., L. Diaz Anadon, H. Breetz, M. 
Bunn, H. Lee and E. Mielke (2011): Transforming 
the Energy Economy: Options for Accelerating 
the Commercialization of Advanced Energy 
Technologies.
Nemet, G.F. (2009): Demand-pull, technology-
push, and government-led incentives for non-
incremental technical change. Research Policy, 
Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 700-9.
Nordhaus, W. and J. Boyer (2000): Warming the 
world: economic modeling of global warming, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Olmos, L., D. Newbery, S. Ruester, S.J. Liong and 
J.-M. Glachant (2011): Public support for the 
financing of RD&D activities in new clean 
energy technologies. Final report of the EU FP7 
Funded Research project THINK (Topic n° 1/11: 
http://think.eui.eu). ISBN:978-92-9084-066-4; 
doi:10.2870/34121.
42
Final Report – January 2013
http://think.eui.eu
Pazienza, M.G., G. Iannuzzi and M. Massaro (2011): 
The impact of current climate and energy policies 
on the public budget of EU Member States. 
Working Paper University of Florence, Rivista di 
Studi sullo Stato. Available at http://www.unifi.it/
rivsts/saggi/Pazienza%20impact/Impact.pdf 
Peneder, M. (2008): The problem of private under-
investment in innovation: A policy mind map. 
Technovation, Vol. 28, pp. 518-30.
Ragwitz M., A. Held, B. Breitschopf, M. Rathmann, 
C. Klessmann, G. Resch, C. Panzer, S. Busch, 
K. Neuhoff, M. Junginger, R. Hoefnagels, N. 
Cusumano, A. Lorenzoni, J. Burgers, M. Boots, 
I. Konstantinaviciute and B. Weöres (2011): 
Review report on support schemes for renewable 
electricity and heating in Europe. Report 
prepared within the Intelligent Energy Europe 
project RE-Shaping - Shaping an effective and 
efficient European renewable energy market.
Rametsteiner, E. and G. Weiss (2006): Assessing 
policies from a systems perspective – Experiences 
with applied innovation systems analysis and 
implications for policy evaluation. Forest Policy 
and Economics, Vol. 8, pp. 564-76.
Ranci, P. (2012): Preface to ‘Part III – Academic visions 
of the future generation portfolio’. In: Glachant et 
al. (eds.): EU energy innovation policy towards 
2050. Claeys & Casteels Publishing. 
Roland Berger and WWF (2012): Clean Economy, 
Living Planet - The Race to the Top of Global 
Clean Energy Technology Manufacturing. Report 
commissioned by WWF.
Ropenus, S. and S.G. Jensen (2009): Support Race 
against the European RES Target. 10th IAEE 
European Conference Proceedings.
Ruester, S., C.v. Hirschhausen, C. Marcantonini, 
X. He, J. Egerer and J.-M. Glachant (2012): 
EU involvement in electricity and natural gas 
transmission grid tarification. Final report of the 
EU FP7 Funded Research project THINK (Topic 
n° 6/12: http://think.eui.eu). ISBN:978-92-9084-
076-3; doi:10.2870/35676.
Ruester, S., J. Vasconcelos, X. He, E. Chong and J.-
M. Glachant (2012b): Electricity storage: How 
to facilitate its deployment and operation in 
the EU. Final report of the EU FP7 Funded 
Research project THINK (Topic n° 8/12: 
http://think.eui.eu). ISBN:978-92-9084-086-2; 
doi:10.2870/41627.
Schmidt, T.S., M. Schneider, K.S. Rogge, M.J.A. 
Schuetz and V.H. Hoffmann (2012): The effects 
of climate policy on the rate and direction of 
innovation: A survey of the EU ETS and the 
electricity sector. Environmental Innovation and 
Societal Transitions, Vol. 2, pp. 23-48.
Spencer, B. and J. Brander (1983): International R&D 
rivalry and industrial Strategy. NBER Working 
Paper No. 1192. 
Stavins, R.N. (1995): Transaction costs and tradeable 
permits. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, Vol. 29, pp. 133-48.
Stern, N. (2006): Stern Review on the economics of 
climate change. 
http://think.eui.eu 43
A New EU Energy Technology Policy towards 2050: Which Way to Go?
Stevens, P. (2012): The ‘shale gas revolution’: 
Developments and changes. Chatham House 
Briefing Paper. 
Veugelers, R. (2011): Europe’s Clean Technology 
Investment Challenge. Bruegel Policy Brief 
2001/06.
Weitzman, M.L. (1974): Prices vs. quantities. Review 
of Economic Studies, Vol. 41, pp. 479-91. 
44
Final Report – January 2013
http://think.eui.eu
Appendix A-1: Pathways towards 
2050
Ø	Baseline (CPI scenario on which all the others 
build): 2020 horizon: 20-20-20 targets, existing 
ETS and non-ETS policies, etc. // 2025+ horizon: 
carbon prices determined such that 2050 targets 
are reached, equal prices/values for ETS and non-
ETS // increasing fuel efficiency in transport sector
Ø	High energy efficiency: Political commitment 
to higher energy savings and additional strong 
requirements and obligations
Ø	High RES: Strong support measures (both MP 
and TP) // also facilitation and enabling policies 
(permitting, preferential grid access)
Ø	Diversified technologies: No technology 
preferred // driven by strong carbon pricing 
scheme
Ø	Delayed CCS: Similar to ‘diversified supply 
technologies’ with delayed CCS deployment
Ø	Low nuclear: Similar to ‘diversified supply 
technologies’ without any new built nuclear
(a) Energy Roadmap 2050
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Roadmap Scenarios Emissions 2050 Scope
ECF Roadmap 2050 
(from ECF)
Baseline
80% less to 1990 in all scenarios EU-27 + Norway + 
Switzerland
40% RES (RES share is an input)
60% RES (RES share is an input)
80% RES (RES share is an input)
Energy (R)evolution 
(from Greenpeace)
Reference 16% less to 1990
EU-27Energy (R)evolution 80% less to 1990
Advanced Energy (R)evolution 95% less to 1990
ETP 2010, Blue Map 
(from IEA)
Baseline 8% less to 2007 OECD Europe plus 
WorldBLUE 75% less to 2007
ETP 2012 
(from IEA)
6DS (worst case) + 6°C OECD Europe plus 
World4DS (baseline) + 4°C 
2DS (vision) + 2°C 
Power Choices 
(from Eurelectric)
Baseline Not calculated
EU-27Power Choices 75% less to 2005
(b) Alternative roadmaps
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Appendix A-2: The SET Plan and 
investments in low-carbon RD&D 
The SET Plan
The SET Plan adopted in 2008 has been a first step 
towards establishing an energy technology policy 
for Europe. This so called “technology pillar” of the 
EU energy and climate policy aims at accelerating 
the development and deployment of low-carbon 
technologies. Its implementation started with the 
establishment of the European Industrial Initiatives 
(EIIs) which bring together industry, the research 
community, Member States and the Commission.22 
Within these Initiatives, strategic objectives have 
been formulated based on Technology Roadmaps that 
identify priority actions for the decade from 2010 to 
2020. More specific Implementation Plans, containing 
descriptions of proposed RD&D activities, as well 
as suggestions about potential funding sources, 
are developed regularly for three-year periods. 
Comparing the current level of expenditures with that 
necessary to deliver the priority actions up to 2020, 
a financing gap of EUR 47-60bn has been estimated 
(Table 3).
In parallel, the European Energy Research Alliance 
(EERA) has been working since 2008 to align the 
R&D activities of individual research organizations to 
the needs of the SET Plan priorities, and to establish 
a joint programming framework at the EU level in 
order to use available research capabilities efficiently. 
To support the SET Plan, the Strategic Energy 
22  Th ese EIIs include the European Industrial Bio-
energy Initiative, the European CO2 Capture, Transport 
and Storage Initiative, the European Electricity Grid Ini-
tiative, the Sustainable Nuclear Initiative, the Solar Europe 
Initiative and the European Wind Initiative.
Technologies Information System (SETIS) aims at 
establishing an open access information system 
on low-carbon technologies and capacities for 
innovation. Regular publications include the 
Technology Mapping (in-depth description of 
the state-of-the-art of low-carbon technologies, 
current RD&D activities, industry structure, etc.) 
and Capacities Mapping (estimation of private and 
public R&D investment in the priority technologies 
of the SET Plan). SETIS also works with the European 
Technology Platforms (ETPs), led by the industry, who 
help defining research objectives. 
Investments in RD&D of low-carbon technolo-
gies
The scope of energy technology policy is large. 
Although at present of the total EUR 3bn spent 
annually on non-nuclear energy R&D in the EU 
about 70% is funded by the private sector, public co-
funding inherits a multiplier and catalyzing effect. The 
major part of public funding, about 80%, is provided 
by Member States and only about 20% by the EU, 
or 7% of the total EUR 3bn spent annually – which 
equals less than EUR 160mn per year (see Figure 2). 
These numbers illustrate that, first, effective policies 
have to exploit Member State and EU sources, and 
second, not only the amount of technology funds, but 
the entire EU-wide regulatory framework from R&D 
to commercialization have to form an environment in 
which private spending in clean technologies pays off. 
Total EU funding during the last years remained at 
quite stable proportions with some increases for solar 
technologies. Especially for wind, recent increases in 
innovation expenditures can mainly be attributed to 
the corporate sector. 
Several points emerge from Figure 2. The example of 
nuclear fusion shows that there is no private funding, 
and public funding is shared almost equally between 
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the EU and Member States, as no company believes 
that it will be commercial in anything but the distant 
future. In contrast, the high level of private RD&D 
in hydrogen and fuel cells is largely driven by the 
automobile industry, whose large global companies 
and research intensity greatly exceed that of the 
electricity industry.
Figure 2: Investments in RD&D of low-carbon technologies
Source: Own depiction using data from the “2011 Capacities Map” published by the JRC [2007 data]
Table 3: Current funding and estimated financing needs for key SET Plan technologies [mn EUR /yr average]
Sector Public EU current Yearly total current Financing need 
identified in SET Plan
Hydrogen and fuel cells  70 620 500
Wind 11 380 550
Solar (PV and CSP) 32 470 1,600
Bio-energy 13 350 850
Smart grids 14 270 200
CCS 17 290 1,050-1,650
Nuclear fusion 204 485
Nuclear fission – generation IV 5 460 500-1,000
Smart cities n.a. n.a. 1,000-1,200
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Appendix A-3: National RES-E 
support instruments
Source: Ecofys et al. (2011)
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Appendix A-4: Conclusions Industrial 
Council meeting (based on report 
version “V0”, Sept. 2012)
Serge Galant
Technofi
Background: The present annex aims at shedding 
light on the first round of discussions about the 
preliminary report on “An EU energy technology 
policy towards 2050”.
The issue: The discussions can be summarized as 
follows: “the EU needs to evolve from existing policy 
instruments by adjusting the SET Plan towards a 
long-term, technology push, energy system-oriented 
policy at EU level, mixing several ways to fund it”.
What lacks in the first draft report: completeness 
issues?
The present study initiates a changed management 
process (improve existing energy policy). To make 
this change process successful, the process must 
follow three steps: (i) clearly states what must be 
abandoned from the past, (ii) describe what is the 
long term “dream” from this technology policy, and 
(iii) define the first intermediate policy target(s) 
which must be reached to make the long term dream 
comes true.
The report must therefore address the following 
questions:
- What are the energy technology policy 
components at EU level which have failed, on the 
basis of indisputable data to demonstrate it?
- What is the collective dream for the revamped 
energy technology policy? From the discussions 
during the hearing, it can be described as “a trade-
off between environment-driven orientations 
at the least cost to implement them, provided 
that the resulting technology is manufactured 
in Europe”. This requires shaping up the long 
term dream with an appropriate wording (how 
to describe the new policy orientations: CO2-
free economy, use of renewable, energy/resource 
efficiency, others…)
- When is the first successful step located (2020, 
2030, other?) and what is the indisputable targets 
which must be reached to make players confident 
that the long term policy goals will be met.
Comparing the boundary conditions that Europe 
must face to design and implement such energy 
technology policy with past successful ones in 
other continents could help support the new policy 
orientations. 
The first example is the USA where ARPA-E is 
replicating what has been done by DARPA in 
Defense technologies and the SBIR in manufacturing 
technologies:
- Public investments address generic technologies 
that can be applied in many areas of the energy 
world (energy storage, smart control devices, 
metering, etc…)
- Overarching goals drive the first steps of the 
technology learning curve (over the twentieth 
century, it has been ( proven or fictitious) national 
security concerns in the USA): the purchase of the 
first/second generation technology is subsidized 
by public orders which accept to pay a very high 
price to construct the learning curve (Defense 
orders in the case on security concerns)
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- Next, technology costs are driven down by 
volume effects and further innovation in order to 
reach a market price level where the free market 
is ready to purchase.
There is recent evidence that the USA is addressing 
the development of a value chain in biofuels for 
commercial aircraft (a significant share of the air travel 
cost) by constructing the learning curve through 
Defense needs (use of biofuels to reduce the cost of 
Defense operations in naval and aircraft operations).
The second example is Japan where consumers 
amortize the R&D costs of new technologies (in many 
sectors) by placing orders located in the internal 
market, before they are sold abroad at reduced costs.
For technology push policies, a typical drawback 
(push the winners) must be underlined: it very 
often kills opportunities for the development of 
breakthrough technologies which have a higher pace 
of improvement when first available.
Last but not least, the aftermath of the present 
economic and financial crisis will restrain public 
funding which must be compensated by private 
contributions. Europe is so far lagging.
What is still fuzzy and must be clarified?
The scope of the work is “energy technology policy 
for an innovative energy system”.
For past energy technology policy failures, provide 
examples at Member State and EU level. For past 
policy successes, provide examples at Member States 
(nuclear in France, wind in Denmark), and EU level.
The proposed policy options, as presented in the first 
draft report, might oversimplify the policy issues 
raised by the 2050 Agenda. Make sure that interactions 
between policy components are clearly appraised: the 
example was given for two policy implementations 
the ETS and Subsidies for renewables that are 
annihilating each other benefits.
The retained policy options must be framed with 
respect to past energy history. What went wrong in 
the past 20 years comes probably from the following 
paradox:
- Member States have their own energy technology 
policy,
- The EU invests between 15 and 20% above the 
Member States investments,
- EU investments should address system issues 
which hamper the implementation of the three 
pillars of EU energy policy (market efficiency, 
security of supply, renewables), which in turn 
mean stronger and stronger interdependences 
between Member States,
- National energy policy makers do not want to 
claim that they depend on other Member States 
(which is less and less time – see the single 
electricity market)
What are the potential incoherencies in the first 
draft which must be addressed?
The report aims at highlighting policy options: it 
should avoid recommending one of them, but should 
pinpoint the potential benefits and drawbacks of each 
of them (or a combination).
A mix of policy options is a highly probable 
recommendation due to the diversity of the energy 
landscape in Europe whatever the single options to 
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be proposed. The main recommendation for policy 
option is: market is as stable (robust?) as possible since 
the journey towards 2050 will be long and bumpy.
One of the challenge is to design a technology push 
(system-oriented) policy at European level which is 
as stable as possible irrespective of past technology 
choices (or absence of choices) at Member States level.
Policy stability can be reached by addressing 
(generic) crosscutting technologies at EU level. 
They have multiple applications which make the 
efficiency of public investment much higher (not all 
fields of applications can go wrong at the same time). 
Examples of such generic technologies are: storage, 
metering, remote digital control, etc.
Since the issue is to promote an innovative energy 
system in the single EU market, there are many non-
technological barriers which can hamper the market 
acceptance of the energy technologies (IPP, business 
models, regulations, public acceptance). They must 
be addressed in the report and, once validated as 
critical, very early in the development cycle.
Appendix A-5: Conclusions project 
advisors (based on report version 
“V0”, Sept. 2012)
Wladyslaw Mielczarski
Technical University of Lodz
Technologies. You have correctly identified that 
in practical terms we have four main technologies: 
nuclear, CCS, RES and energy efficiency (EE). The 
current situation with nuclear, in particular after 
Fukushima, indicates that it is not likely that nuclear 
will play a significant role in Europe in the future. 
There are also many concerns relating CCS. From the 
engineering point of view we can catch CO2 in power 
stations, although at high costs. We are also able to 
transform CO2 gas into a liquid and transport it by 
pipelines. The problem lays in CO2 storage (geological 
and legal problems). We do not know what will be 
the reaction of CO2 with geological structures after 
several hundreds (or thousands) years. Europe is 
densely populated so it will be difficult to find safe 
storage sites. There are also legal concerns. Who will 
be owner of CO2 when pumped underground? Do we 
have to create some kind of a gas storage operator? 
How can we impose the obligation to finance such 
an operator and his activities? Who can provide the 
insurance for such storage? And many others.
Achievability of climate policy targets. In practice, 
we have only two technologies (or precisely speaking 
groups of technologies): RES and EE. Of course, EE 
is the best measure as the energy not generated is the 
cleanest. However, many countries will need more 
energy, so in the best case, we can assume that demand 
will remain stable, but a more reasonable assumption 
is that demand will grow annually at a rate of 0.5% 
for the developed European countries and 1% for 
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new Member States. So the reduction of emissions 
by 80%, or the zero emission power industry, will 
require increasing RES production from the current 
10% to 100%. Is it the realistic assumption? I doubt. 
Not only regarding costs, but also from the technical 
point of view. The next question appears. Can we 
expect breakthroughs in technologies? Rather not. 
Energy storage or smart networks can lead to the 
better utilization of the existing power production 
assets but cannot produce energy themselves.
Support systems for RES. Despite the difficulties we 
face in the achievability of climate policy targets, we 
should do the best to increase RES production. Before 
we go to the features of the best support system we 
should shortly analyze how the existing systems 
operate. There are two systems: feed-in-tariffs and 
green certificates. Both are examples of the open 
systems, i.e. the systems without expenditure caps, 
so it is very common experience that costs of RES 
subsidies exploded causing that some Member States 
started introducing a limitation on RES support. 
Italy, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Spain and Poland are 
among such countries. The current support systems 
are directed to the operation of RES separating RES 
from the competitive market, so if we introduced a 
Road Map for RES development, keeping the existing 
systems of subsidies, it would be a Road Map of 
competitive market limitation. RES can be outside 
the market when production is below 10%, but if we 
want to achieve 30% and more, RES must operate in 
competitive markets under the same rules as other 
producers. Currently, the decisions on support for 
RES is left to Member States and such decision can 
be changed by these countries sending misleading 
signals to investors.
What should be the main features of the efficient 
support systems for RES? They should be: (a) stable, 
(b) uniform in all Member States, (c) allowing for 
support of large-scale projects such as wind farms 
in the North Sea and smaller and micro-scale 
generation; (d) robust to the impact from other system 
inefficiencies as for example the EU ETS; (e) based on 
solidarity of support for RES i.e. commitment to the 
RES funds in proportion to GDP; (f) and - the most 
important - the support should allow such generation 
operating in competitive electricity markets. It would 
be valuable for your report if you can give some 
examples of such support systems. 
Technology impact. There are many fears, in 
particular recently expressed, that investing in RES 
in Europe, we are losing competitiveness compared 
to Asia as the production of RES installations leak 
to other countries with lower labor costs. It is true 
to some degree. Europe cannot be competitive in 
labor cost with Asia and Africa but by controlling 
the main elements of the chain value we can gain 
and can keep the technological advances. In the 
following example you can see elements of the value 
chain for PV cells production and installation with 
the suggestion, which elements will stay in Europe 
or will leak (or already leaked) to Asia or in future 
to Africa: (i) R&D – Europe // (ii) Design of RES 
equipment – Europe // (iii) Production of equipment 
(automation and robots) for RES assembly factories 
– Europe // (iv) Production of silicon – Asia/ Africa 
// (v) Manufacturing of PV cells – Asia/ Africa // (vi) 
Design of installations for PV-cells – Europe/Regions 
// (vii) Construction of installations for PV-cells – 
Europe/Regions // (viii) Service and maintenance of 
PV-cells – Europe/Regions. As you can see, from eight 
elements of the chain value, six (the most profitable) 
are in Europe.
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François Lévêque
CERNA, Mines ParisTech
This report on EU energy technology policy is sound 
and elegant. The addressed questions are clearly 
stated as well as the answers given by the authors. My 
main comment is that the definition of the energy 
technology policy is too broad. It encompasses both 
R&D and innovation diffusion. Moreover, tradable 
permit systems and carbon tax are viewed as energy 
technology policy instruments. This is astonishing 
for these instruments are merely seen by economists 
as technology-neutral. According to the authors, the 
absence of technology policy is a technology policy 
and any environmental policy instrument is an 
energy technology policy instrument. The frontier 
between energy policy and energy technology policy 
is therefore blurred. 
My second main comment deals with the insufficient 
interest of the authors for data. Their political science 
approach is very legitimate and is very appropriate 
with the topic. However, this is not a reason to neglect 
numbers and findings based on quantitative analysis. 
The absence of references on patents is an example. 
Over the past ten years, research on patent applications 
and diffusion regarding green and conventional 
energy technologies has flourished. Its econometric 
findings have provided interesting insights on the 
respective role of technology push and demand pull 
as well as on technology transfers.
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